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Essays on Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security
Ruoyu Shao, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015
Supervisors: John M. Griffin
Haiqing Xu
Structured finance products including Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Security (CMBS) suffered tremendous losses during the 2008 financial crisis.
My dissertation consists of three chapters that contribute to our understanding
of the causes of the crisis.
My first chapter is an empirical study on potential misrepresentation of
CMBS. Although CMBS suffered large scale losses during the past financial cri-
sis, currently, this segment of the structured finance market has almost recov-
ered to its pre-crisis level. While evidence was found regarding the systematic
misrepresentation of loan quality information for residential mortgages, there
was no evidence of large scale misreporting for CMBS. This paper examines
important financial variables reported in financial documentation of commer-
cial mortgages such as Underwritten Net Operating Income (UW NOI). I find
that, prior to the financial crisis, UW NOI was consistently over-estimated by
an average of 7.8%. This overstatement lead to Loan-to-Value ratio and Debt-
Service Coverage Ratio being misreported as 67.1% from 84.2% and DSCR as
1.72 from 1.59. The levels of aggregate over-estimation substantially differed
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among originators and the variations explained the performance differences
between originators. Each 1% increase in over-estimation resulted in a 20%
higher likelihood in delinquency. The ratings issued by rating agencies failed
to capture the adverse impact from over-estimation on CMBS performance.
The second chapter of my dissertation studies the CMBS credit rating
market using a strategic interaction model. The 2008 financial crisis that arose
in the mortgage market has brought renewed attention to the failure of the
credit rating mechanism. Using Bloomberg data, I conduct a structural anal-
ysis of strategic credit rating behaviors in the Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Security (CMBS) market. This chapter models the CMBS credit ratings as
strategic behaviors that reflect the peer effects from other rating agencies.
Peer effects are incorporated through the estimation of market “beliefs” about
the ratings. We establish semiparametric identification of the model by ex-
ploiting an exogenous equilibrium shift due to the financial crisis. Moreover,
the model is estimated using a two–step estimation procedure. The empirical
results strongly support the presence of positive peer effects. By including
peer effects, the fitness of our model has been significantly improved.
The third chapter examines the entrant-related consequences in the
CMBS credit rating market after the financial crisis. I find that the entrant
has given more lenient ratings than the incumbents. Among securities that
obtained ratings from both entrant and incumbent rating agencies, 13.8% are
granted a higher rating from the entrant than the incumbents from 2011-2014.
In addition, deal level and loan level analyses further provide evidence that
vii
the entrant granted CMBS with 2.25% higher AAA-rated portion while the
underlying loans in these CMBS are 10% more likely to become delinquent
than other rating agencies. The lenient ratings from the entrant coincide with
the sharp increase in the entrant’s market share.
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Chapter 1
Examination of Potential Misrepresentation in
CMBS
1.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, a growing amount of studies have
been focusing on related parties’s roles in the formation of the crisis. Related
to the massive and unprecedented defaults and losses brought on by residential
mortgages and the structured finance products whose main underlying assets
are mortgages, increasing focus has been placed on mortgage-related fraud
from regulators (FBI, SEC and FHA), the media, and the academic world.
For example, ? and ? demonstrate large scale misrepresentation in residential
mortgages-backed securitized (RMBS) before the crisis. Their studies argue
that second-lien loan status, owner-occupying status, and property appraisal
value were largely misreported prior to the crisis. More importantly, the iden-
tified misreporting is associated with significantly higher default probabilities,
and consequently, has resulted in the loss for RMBS backed by these mort-
gages.
Despite the intense scrutiny and attention brought on by the losses
and downgrades in Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) during
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the crisis1 and the misreporting in RMBS, no reports or studies have revealed
systematic misreporting in commercial mortgage origination. Meanwhile, new
CMBS issuance has nearly recovered to its pre-crisis level in terms of number of
deals issued.2 The CMBS market seems to be shrugging off the bad publicity
and heading to another boom market.
In this chapter, I examine the potential misreporting in commercial
mortgages securitized into CMBS using detailed loan level data from Bloomberg
Professional. The main financial variable focused on in this dissertation is Un-
derwritten Net Operating Income (UW NOI). I begin by comparing the UW
NOI to realized NOI at the end of the origination year. UW NOI was inflated
by, on average, 4.8% for the years between 1995 and 2006. As the crisis ap-
proached, CMBS grew rapidly; the over-estimation was more severe. During
2003-2007, despite the booming real estate market and good economic condi-
tions, the average over-estimation reached 7.8%. The economic consequences
for the difference between UW NOI and realized NOI were substantial. If all
loans were re-appraised using unbiased estimation with the same capitaliza-
tion rates, the average Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio increased from 67.4% to
84.2% and the average Debt-Service Coverage ratio (DSCR) deteriorated from
1.67 to 1.48. The differences substantially increased the risk and pricing of
the mortgage. Consequently, it resulted in a higher demand for subordination
1For 2005 to 2008 vintage, the average downgrades are 10 notches, equivalently, from
AAA to BB+.
2Number of deal issuances for US non-agency CMBS peaked at 158 in 2006, dropped to
26 in 2009, then recovered to 124 in 2013. In comparison, RMBS and CDO (not including
CLO) issuance after crisis is a small fraction of its peak level in 2006.
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level for the corresponding CMBS by investors and rating agencies. Higher
AAA subordination levels certainly reduced the downgrades and defaults that
occurred during the crisis.
The realized NOI of the origination year is an ex-post measure for UW
NOI. Thus, two alternative explanations could justify the over-estimation.
First, the over-estimation may simply be caused by unexpectedly low realiza-
tion of NOI. Second, the more interesting case – the over-estimation – is caused
by biased estimation generated by originators and borrowers in order to make
the loans appear less risky. This dissertation formally lays out five hypotheses
to test for these two alternatives. The results reject the null hypothesis and
imply that a significant part of the over-estimation is attributed to biased UW
NOI at origination.
This study also documents the large cross-sectional differences in over-
estimation and probability of delinquency group by originators; more impor-
tantly, these two fixed effects are highly correlated with each other. Among
eighteen originators that have at least 500 loans with available data during
the sample period, seven originators with significantly positive over-estimation
fixed effects from regression analysis have, on average, 10.6% over-estimation
from 2003-2007. Over-estimation is sensitive to the marginal benefit of in-
flating the UW NOI and over-estimation is higher at securitization thresholds
for key risk characteristics. Originators are at least partially aware of the
over-estimation since loans with over-estimation tend to have a higher inter-
est rate. The variations in the originator level of over-estimation explain the
3
performance differences among originators. According to the result of logis-
tic regression, each 1% increase in UW NOI over-estimation results in a 20%
higher likelihood in severe delinquency.
I then examine whether CMBS investors are fully compensated for the
over-estimation in terms of higher AAA subordination level. While deal level
over-estimation of NOI has an impact on deal performance with respect to
delinquency rate, there is no evidence showing that the CMBS with more
over-estimation has a higher AAA subordination level. The finding implies
the rating agencies are unsuccessful in using their private information and
rating models to evaluate the quality of the security.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides a background on misreporting in RMBS and a comparison between
CMBS and RMBS. Section 3 describes the Data. Section 4 focuses on the
main variable of interest, UW NOI. Section 5 uses five hypotheses to test for
the two plausible alternative reasons for over-estimation. Section 6 presents
the results on the relationship between over-estimation and loan performance.
Finally, Section 7 discusses results related to pricing and rating agencies fol-
lowed by a conclusion Section 8.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Misrepresentation in Residential Mortgage
After the realization of large scale losses in RMBS, whether misrep-
resentation on loan quality information contributed to the massive defaults
4
of mortgages was a question to be answered by investors, regulators, and re-
searchers. In 2011, the Supervisory Insights by FDIC said “approximately
one-third of all mortgage fraud cases in 2010 involved appraisal/valuation
fraud.”3 From 2008-2012, there were at least 58 legal cases regarding the ma-
terial breach of representations and warranties of residential mortgage-backed
securities (?). Investment banks have settled for dozens of billions of dollars
for fraud related to RMBS misrepresentation.
? examine three types of misreporting in securitized residential mort-
gages. Their study merges the non-agency securitized loan database (ABSNet)
with the county property transaction record database (DataQuick). By com-
paring the two databases, the authors identify 13.4% of loans marked as having
no second lien, do appear to have a second lien. 7.7% of loans reported as being
owner-occupied, do not appear to be owner occupied. Moreover, by comparing
the appraisal value derived from reported LTV ratio to an industry-leading au-
tomated valuation model (AVM), their article concludes that 17.8% of homes
have appraisal values inflation. The study also shows this misreporting is
associated with a 51% higher probability of delinquency.
?, in a parallel study, also examine the misreporting in residential loans.
Their study focuses on two of three misreporting presented in an article by
?: second lien and owner occupancy misreporting. The authors utilize two
different databases and obtain similar results in terms of scale of misrepresen-
3https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin11/siwin11.pdf
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tation and impact on default probability. The study finds that, although the
misreporting was partially priced in via higher coupon for misreported loans,
interestingly, the RMBS investors were not fully compensated by either higher
yield of the security or higher subordination level for AAA-rated tranche.
1.2.2 CMBS Background
The annual issuance for non-agency CMBS grew rapidly from 57 bil-
lion in 2000 to 269 billion in 2007. During the financial crisis, CMBS suffered
tremendous losses due to high delinquency. The market was almost com-
pletely shut down in 2009 and 2010 when the annual issuances were merely
24 and 22 billion dollars. After the meltdown from the crisis, the structured
finance industry attempted to restart the market and CMBS issued since then
are called “CMBS 2.0”. The industry deems “CMBS 2.0” a euphemism for
“lessons learned.”4 The annual issuance recovered to 90 billion in 2013 and
the number of deals issued has almost recovered to its pre-crisis level.5
Some extant literature studies the CMBS market. Asymmetric infor-
mation and adverse selection are two of the important features in the secu-
ritization market. During the securitization process, the information related
to the risk of the property and borrower is compressed to summary indicators
such as LTV and DSCR, which serve as rating models inputs and the vari-
ables describing the risk of the CMBS in its prospectus. The originators for
4CMBS 2.0: What is it? from Dechert LLP Feb 13, 2012.
5In contrast, the RMBS issuance for 2013 is only 10% of its 2006 level.
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commercial mortgages are categorized into two types: a conduit lender, who
originates loans for direct sale into CMBS, and a portfolio lender, who sells
part of their mortgage portfolio to CMBS. ? show that investors are com-
pensated by 33 bps for commercial loans from portfolio lenders compared to
conduit lenders. However, ? find that loans originated by conduit lenders have
a higher hazard rate for default. ? attribute the expansion of the issuance and
inflation of the ratings of the pre-crisis CMBS to excess demand created by
the loosening capital requirements on investment grade CMBS in 2002. That
year, the regulatory change by the SEC lowered the capital requirement for
senior CMBS tranches compared to directly holding commercial loans. The
authors also show that, although there were few changes in the quality of the
assets, the persistent reduction in subordination level for senior bonds lead to
losses for senior CMBS tranches during the financial crisis.
1.2.3 Comparison between Residential and Commercial Mortgage
Origination Process, and Implication on Potential Mis-reporting
Compared to residential mortgages, the commercial mortgage appraisal
process involves more soft information, which is property-specific, subjective
information. According to the data, refinance accounts for 65% of all stated
reasons for obtaining a commercial loan. In these cases, no actual transaction
prices are available to loan originators. Moreover, even in a situation where the
transaction values are available, the originator usually uses the appraisal value
rather than the actual transaction value to calculate the LTV Ratio. These
practices lead to more dependence on the appraisal value. Any distortion in
7
appraisal value could lead to substantial financial gains for both borrowers and
originators in terms of lower interest rate and easier securitization, respectively.
By comparing commercial and residential mortgages, I am able to iden-
tify several factors supporting my claim that there may have been large scale
misreporting in the commercial mortgage origination process.
1. Conflicting incentives and an asymmetric information problem induced
by securitization are similar to RMBS.
2. Some of the originators and underwriters who were found responsible for
RMBS misreporting were also involved in the origination and securitiza-
tion process in CMBS.
3. The property value appraisal process and other origination procedures
for commercial loans utilize more subjective information compared to
residential mortgages. Thus, this opacity provides space for misreport-
ing, and meanwhile, it makes potential misreporting difficult to identify.
Additionally, several reasons explain why large scale misreporting has
less of a likelihood of occurring in the commercial mortgage origination process.
1. Commercial mortgage borrowers are commonly enterprises and residen-
tial mortgage borrowers are commonly individuals. Enterprise may po-
tentially have more discipline in reporting.
2. The average size of a commercial mortgage is much bigger than a residen-
tial mortgage, and there are, on average, fewer loans in CMBS compared
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to RMBS. Thus, more scrutiny and supervision may be paid to each
property from investors, rating agencies, and other market participants.
3. Prior to the crisis, there were less price appreciation and volatility for
commercial properties compared to residential properties.
Several obstacles make it difficult for researchers to study and iden-
tify potential misrepresentation and other types of wrongdoing in the financial
industry. These obstacles include data availability and information timeli-
ness. As a consequence, existing literature in forensic finance is often about
topics where fraudulent activities have already been reported and discovered.
Meanwhile, as researchers, we also have certain advantages over other parties
in discovering potential fraudulent activities. First, we usually have a less-
biased, ex-ante opinion compared to other parties who are often financially
tied to the findings. Second, we have the ability and necessary tools to study
these subjects with large scale data in hypothesis testing settings.
1.3 Data
The data for this paper mainly comes from Bloomberg Professional.
Bloomberg has deal level data, tranche (bond) level data as well as loan (prop-
erty) level data for CMBS. Deal level data includes average Loan-to-Value
(LTV) ratio, average Debt-Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR), original balance,
weighted average coupon (WAC), average amortization speed, number of loans,
and other aggregate deal level information. For tranche level data, Bloomberg
9
has tranche balance, credit support, rating history, and other tranche-specific
information. Loan level data is categorized into three types. First, Bloomberg
has information for the loan/property at origination. Such information in-
cludes loan balance, loan term, amortization schedule, coupon schedule, Un-
derwritten Net Operating Income (UW NOI), LTV, DSCR appraisal value,
and other static information such as address and type of the property. Second,
Bloomberg also contains the current information of the loan such as loan sta-
tus (e.g., delinquency, prepaid, defeased). Third, the loan level data contains
the time series of the financial information such as NOI, revenue, expense, and
occupancy rate, which are extracted from the monthly trustee report. This
information is generally available until the loan is terminated.
Bloomberg in general has good coverage on the data although a signif-
icant amount of deals are missing loan level information. In my observation,
the following main reasons account for Bloomberg’s lack of the loan level data.
First, Bloomberg has relatively poorer coverage for older vintages. Second,
Bloomberg has low coverage CMBS deals that are private placements. Private
placement securities are not regulated by the SEC to release deal quality infor-
mation to public. For a certain amount of CMBS that have deal, tranche, and
some loan level data coverage, Bloomberg does not have coverage for a time
series of financial variables and so this does not allow me to perform certain
analyses.
10
1.3.1 Variable Description
The following loan characteristics are used in regression analysis to
control for the risk of the loan.
Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio and Debt-Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR):
These two variables are considered the most important predictors for mortgage
default. According to publicly available rating criteria, both variables are
important inputs in CMBS rating models. LTV ratio reflects the difference
between initial loan balance and the appraisal value of the property. The
lower the ratio, the stronger the ability for the loan to sustain a decline in
the property value. In case of default, LTV ratio also determines the recovery
rate after a foreclosure. Unlike residential mortgages, for which property values
are determined by actual transaction prices in most cases, appraisers generally
determine the value for commercial mortgages. Moreover, due to the nature
of commercial property, the appraisal process often involves more judgment
and “soft” information about the property. This potentially leaves more room
for borrowers and originators to shop for a high valuation. DSCR compares
the net cash flow for the property to the debt payment. A higher DSCR ratio
suggests that the property has more net cash flow compared to debt service.
Loan Size: This is measured by the original balance of the loan. Loan
size may affect the level of supervision and scrutiny from investors and rating
agencies. Loan size potentially relates to the default probability.
Cutoff Coupon/Spread: Most CMBS loans are floating rate mortgages.
11
The spread is used to measure the view from the originator regarding the risk
of the loans.
Term of Maturity: The typical terms of a commercial mortgage range
from 10 to 30 years.
Amortization: Commercial loans are (mostly) not fully amortized at the
end loan term. One common schedule for amortization is a 10/30 schedule:
the loan matures in 10 years but the amortization is based on 30 years. Thus,
at the end of the loan term, there is a substantial amount of unpaid principle.
Before the financial crisis, an increasing amount of loans had very slow or no
amortization (interest only loans). In this chapter, I categorize commercial
mortgages in CMBS into three groups: interest only or balloon loans (zero or
negative amortization), partial interest only (some but not full amortization),
and full amortization loans. I include the fixed effects for these categories of
amortization speed into all regressions.
Number of Properties: A small portion of loans contain multiple prop-
erties. The diversification effect may affect the risk of the loans.
Property type: Loan performance may vary across different types of
properties. In this paper, I categorize commercial properties into five main
types following the industry convention: office, retail, hotel, industrial, and
multifamily.6
6There are more than five categories according to the code in Bloomberg. All other
property types are included in the “industrial” type.
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1.3.2 Sample Selection
The data covers CMBS issued from 1990 to the end of 2013. Data
coverage between 1990 and 1994 is scare so I mainly focus on post-1995 CMBS
deals. Since results are sensitive to the economic and real estate downturn, I
limit my main analysis to pre-2006 deals to avoid the impact from the financial
crisis.
There are 96,184 loans in the main sample. Among them, 76,018 loans
have loan characteristics and a certain time series of financial information for
analysis. Finally, there are 39,276 loans with the realized NOI available at the
end the origination year.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the delinquency along with
other loan characteristics for the main sample.
1.4 Net Operating Income
Underwritten Net Operating Income (UW NOI) is the most important
financial variable for a commercial mortgage. Since a borrower for a com-
mercial mortgage is commonly an independent entity, the cash flow from the
property will be the sole source for debt service. The UW NOI also serves
as a key input for the commercial property appraisal process following Equa-
tion (1.1).
PropertyAppraisalV alue =
UWNOI
CapitalizationRate
(1.1)
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The appraiser usually derives the applicable capitalization rate from
the market capitalization rates for similar properties in that area. Certain ad-
justments are made according to property conditions and other factors. Fixing
the capitalization rate, the appraisal value is proportional to UW NOI. The
appraisal value is used to calculate LTV ratio, which is one of the most im-
portant risk measures. A higher appraisal value helps a borrower be eligible
for a larger loan balance as well as a lower interest rate.
Following Equation (1.2), the UW NOI also goes into the calculation
of DSCR, which is another key measure for the risk of a loan. Other loan
characteristics such as debt yield are also directly or indirectly determined by
UW NOI.
DSCR =
UWNOI
DebtService
(1.2)
However, for this particularly important variable, the borrower and loan
originator have flexibility with regard to reporting of the variable. In general,
the UW NOI is the best estimation for the upcoming NOI for the property.
The following paragraph is a quotation from the prospectus of a CMBS deal
(deal ticker: CAMC 2002-CAM2).
““Underwritten Net Operating Income” or “U/W NOI” means, with
respect to any Mortgaged Property, an estimate of the total Net Operating
Income anticipated to be available for annual debt service on that Mortgage
Loan, calculated as the amount of Underwritten Revenues minus Underwritten
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Expenses, before considering any reserves, capital expenditures or leasing costs.
The amounts shown on the schedule generally reflect the estimates made by
the related Originator in conducting its underwriting in connection with its
origination of its Mortgage Loans.”
1.4.1 How does the UW NOI compare to Realized NOI?
At the end of each calendar year for the life of a CMBS deal, the trustee
of a CMBS deal issues a trustee report, which documents all the ongoing infor-
mation including the realization of NOI for the past year. I utilize the realized
NOI to compare with the UW NOI by computing the relative difference fol-
lowing Equation (1.3). More specifically, for realized NOI, I use the NOI of
the origination year for my main analysis. In the robustness test, I also use
NOI for the year following the origination year since the NOI of the origination
year is missing for about half of the loans.
OverEstimation =
UWNOI −RealizedNOI
UWNOI
(1.3)
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Over-estimation of NOI for all loans
originated between 1995 and 2006 with available data. I skip the 2007 and later
vintage because, as previously mentioned, I want to avoid the adverse impact
from the financial crisis on the realized NOI. Figure 1 shows the distribution of
over-estimation has a positive mean and skews to the right. This suggests that
borrowers and originators, on average, overstated the UW NOI even during
the booming period prior to the crisis. The UW NOI is inflated by, on average,
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4.8% compared to realized NOI.
1.5 What Causes the Over-estimation of NOI?
In the previous section, I showed, on average, that UW NOI was consis-
tently over-estimated prior to the financial crisis. It is important to understand
that the realized NOI at origination year is an ex-post measure. Thus, it could
be affected by many post-origination random shocks such as variation in rent,
occupancy rate, and operating expense. The natural question to ask would
be whether the over-estimation is caused by an unexpectedly low realization
of NOI (the null hypothesis), or the biased initial estimation (the alterna-
tive hypothesis). An unexpectedly low realization of NOI occurs when the
economy, more specifically, the commercial real estate market, performs worse
than what is expected by borrowers and originators (for example, an adverse
economic condition leads to low rent and a high vacancy rate). The second sit-
uation, the alternative hypothesis, is more problematic since it involves false
representation of the asset’s important financial information. According to
the statement in the CMBS prospectus, the UW NOI is supposed to be an
unbiased estimation produced by the best efforts of loan originators.
In this section, I lay out five hypothesis testings in order to distinguish
these two alternative explanations for NOI over-estimation.
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1.5.1 Time Series of Over-estimation
Hypothesis 1. With only an unexpectedly low realization of NOI and an
unbiased estimation of UW NOI, the over-estimation is positive only when
there is a negative shock in realized NOI. Therefore, positive over-estimation
should occur when the economy and, specifically, the commercial real estate
market, experiences negative shocks with respect to NOI.
The over-estimation is the percentage difference between UW NOI,
which is the esimated NOI based on the best effort provided by the borrower
and the originator. The realized NOI is affected by the general economic
condition in the commercial real estate market. The latter is sensitive to
changes in occupancy rate, rental rate, and property maintenance expense
among other random factors. If the over-estimation is mainly caused by the
low realization of NOI, we should expect positive over-estimation to occur
when the real estate market faces negative shocks and negative over-estimation
to occur when the real estate market faces positive shocks.
Table 2 documents the over-estimation for loans originating between
1997 and 2013. Figure 2 presents the time series of over-estimation and the
annual change of realized NOI. The realized NOI change is calculated by ag-
gregating the annual NOI for outstanding properties when the NOI of last year
and current year are both available. The bar chart demonstrates the annual
issuance of the CMBS.
Several important observations can be gleaned from Figure 2. First, the
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average over-estimation was close to zero during the period between 1997-2002
and it rose sharply after 2003, peaking in 2006 at about 11%. Then very few
loans originated in the 2008 and 2009 period and, after the financial crisis, the
average over-estimation has been relatively low. Second, before the inception
of the crisis, the annual change in realized NOI based on the existing properties
in CMBS had always been positive with only one exception of minor negative
value. During the period when the market experienced very significant over-
estimation of NOI (2003-2007), the commercial real estate market performed
well. Figure 3 presents the distribution for each sub-period.
While the annual change in realized NOI presents a good reflection of
the economic condition of the commercial real estate market, the hypothe-
sis testing requires a comparison between the over-estimation and “economic
shocks.” In unreported results, I lay out an array of measures on “economic
shocks,” which are calculated by the difference between the consensus and
realized value for key macroeconomic and real estate related indicators (e.g.,
home price index, retail sales, jobless claims, GDP growth rate). In unre-
ported results, I document that, during most of the period from 2003-2006,
the realized values were mainly better than the consensus values. This pro-
vides further evidence that the over-estimation did not coincide with adverse
economic shocks.
The implication of the results for Hypothesis 1 is clear. The fact that
significant positive over-estimation of NOI occurred during the period of good
commercial real estate performance rejects the null hypothesis. The years with
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substantial over-estimation, interestingly, coupled with the booming period of
MBS and the period when mis-reporting in RMBS is found to be prevalent.
1.5.2 Originator Heterogeneity
Hypothesis 2. With only an unexpectedly low realization of NOI and an
unbiased estimation of UW NOI, the over-estimation should not be related to
the originator of the loan after controlling for loan characteristics, origination
timing, and location of the property.
If the over-estimation is only caused by low realization of NOI and the
estimation is initially unbiased, the over-estimation should be unrelated to
originator especially after controlling for loan characteristics. The rationale
behind this hypothesis testing is that the random estimation errors made in
different loans cancel out each other out so the average over-estimation by
originators is close to zero. ? show that originators played a central role in
misreported second lien residential mortgages. In this section, I try to study
the cross-sectional differences in over-estimation of NOI among originators. I
focus this part of analysis on those originators that have at least five hundred
loans between 1995 and 2006 with available data; in total, eighteen originators
satisfy this condition.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for over-estimation of NOI by
originators. Table 3 is sorted by the mean of over-estimation. The most
important observation from Table 3 is that large cross-sectional differences
existed among originators. The average over-estimation was as high as 16%
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for LaSalle while Principle Commercial Funding had the lowest over-estimation
of -3%. All originators save three overstated the NOI during the sample period.
The right tail mainly contributes higher-than-zero mean since the distributions
of over-estimation are generally skewed to the right. The rank of mean is very
similar to the rank of 75 Percentile.
In order to formally test Hypothesis 2, regression analysis is performed
to control for the loan characteristics related to over-estimation along with
time- and location-fixed effects following Equation (1.4).
OverEstimationi = α0 + γControlsi +OriginatorFEs
+Y earQuarterFEs+ StateFEs+ i
(1.4)
Figure 4 shows the results between average over-estimation and the
coefficients of the originator fixed effects. The result confirms the rejection
of Hypothesis 2 with 7 out of 18 originators having significant fixed effects
(BOA is the reference originator). The coefficients are highly correlated with
the mean of over-estimation by originators.
1.5.3 Was the Over-estimation Affected by Incentives?
Hypothesis 3. With only an unexpectedly low realization of NOI and an
unbiased estimation of UW NOI, the over-estimation should not be related to
the LTV ratio, DSCR, and other variables linked with the marginal benefit of
inflating UW NOI.
If the over-estimation is only caused by the unexpectedly low realization
of NOI and the estimation is initially unbiased, the degree of over-estimation
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should not respond to the marginal benefit of inflating the UW NOI. Risky
loans—for example, loans with a high LTV ratio and a low DSCR—benefit
more from a marginal change in UW NOI through two channels. First, interest
rates charged to borrowers are usually more responsive to changes in LTV and
DSCR when these two variables indicate the loans are risky. Second, when
originators sell loans to CMBS issuers, the prices of mortgages are mostly
affected by LTV and DSCR when these two variables are near securitization
cutoffs.
Table 4 shows the regression result for over-estimation on LTV, DSCR,
and other loan characteristics following Equation (1.6).
OverEstimationi = α0 + β1LTVi + β2DSCRi + γControlsi
+Y earQuarterFEs+ StateFEs+ i
(1.5)
I examine the impact of LTV ratio in Model (1), the impact of DSCR
in model (2) and jointly in model (3). Loans with high LTV appear to have
significantly higher over-estimation while the impact from DSCR is not signif-
icant. It is also notable that larger loans, loans with higher coupons, floating
rate loans, loans with partial or no amortization, and multifamily properties
tend to have higher over-estimation.
To further verify the relationship of over-estimation and LTV/DSCR,
kernel regressions of over-estimation on LTV and DSCR visualize the results.
Figure 5 shows the plot for the non-parametric analysis regarding LTV. The
over-estimation increases with the LTV from negative to more than 7%. The
result is consistent with the incentive argument: for a high LTV loan, the
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marginal benefit of getting higher appraisal value through over-estimated NOI
is high to both borrowers and originators. Figure 6 shows the results for
DSCR and the result is consistent with the incentive to over-estimate NOI.
More risky loans with lower DSCR have higher over-estimation. In sum, the
results presented in this section reject the null Hypothesis 3.
1.5.4 Has the Over-estimation Been Affected by Securitization Thresh-
old?
Hypothesis 4. With only an unexpectedly low realization of NOI and an
unbiased estimation of UW NOI, the over-estimation should not respond to
securitization thresholds in LTV and DSCR.
Securitization thresholds are certain values for risk measures of a loan.
These particular values are often round numbers and the pricing as well as
securitization of mortgages are often sensitive to whether the risk measures
fall above or below certain thresholds. For example, FICO score 640 is one ex-
ample of the threshold for residential mortgage. A lower than 640 FICO score
makes mortgages subprime and subprime mortgages face a different pricing
and securitization category. For commercial mortgages, 5-unit LTV (such
as 75% and 80%), and DSCR (such as 1.20 and 1.25) values are important
thresholds. For LTV ratio, loans at or just below the thresholds are deemed to
substantially safer, compared to loans just above these thresholds. Sensitivity
to thresholds is driven by the rating matrix used by major rating agencies.
Publicly-available rating criteria shows that the rating matrix is commonly
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based on 5-unit round numbers.7 This creates a strong incentive for origina-
tors and borrowers to make loans to meet these thresholds.
With the benefits for loans reaching these 5-unit thresholds, it is ex-
pected that there will be a large amount loans clustering at these values.
Figure 7 confirms the clustering and it further shows the potential spikes of
over-estimation at the threshold. In unreported results, DSCR thresholds as-
semble a similar pattern.
In order to formally test whether the distributions of over-estimation
are different at 5-unit LTV and DSCR thresholds compared to loans that are
off the thresholds, I draw the distribution and run a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. Figures 8 and 9 present the results for LTV and DSCR, respectively.
The distribution for over-estimation at the thresholds skewed to the right for
both LTV and DSCR. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the over-
estimation of loans at thresholds are more positive than other loans and the
p-values are 0.000 and 0.013, respectively, for LTV and DSCR.
1.5.5 Is Over-estimation Priced in by Originators?
Hypothesis 5. With only an unexpectedly low realization of NOI and an
unbiased estimation of UW NOI, the over-estimation should be unrelated to
the interest rate paid by borrowers.
7For example, the S&P’s “Rating Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. And Cana-
dian CMBS” is available through this link. https://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/
ratings/articles/en/us?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245380021782
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If the UW NOI is an unbiased estimate, the lender should not know
or have any ability to predict the future trend of the cash flow at the origina-
tion. Thus, the pricing of the loan (interest rate charged to borrowers) should
not be related to the over-estimation. Following Equation (1.6), I perform a
regression analysis with origination interest rate (coupon or spread) as a de-
pendent variable on the over-estimation of NOI along with loan characteristics,
location, and time fixed effects.
InterestRatei = α0 + β1OverEstimation+ γControlsi
+Y earQuarterFEs+ StateFEs+ i
(1.6)
Table 5 presents the results and offers several very interesting observa-
tions. In Model (1), the regression includes samples with all originators. The
results suggest that the over-estimation has a positive and significant impact
on the interest rate of the loan. This indicates that the originators knew the
loans were more risky than other loans, which led them to charge borrowers
higher interest rates. In order to verify whether all originators behaved in the
same way, I run the regression on the sub-sample based on originator fixed ef-
fects on over-estimation from previous section. Model (2) only includes loans
with significantly positive fixed effects for over-estimation (“bad” originator)
and Model (3) includes the rest of the loans (“good” originator). The coeffi-
cient for these “bad” originators goes up, and meanwhile, the coefficient for
these “good” originators is no longer significant. One interpretation for the
results is that a “bad” originator knows an ex-ante over-estimation exists but
the “good” originator does not know. The results further verify the rejection
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of the null hypothesis.
Combining the results with the heterogeneity of over-estimation in orig-
inators, reasonable suspicion is made about the question of whether certain
originators systematically reported biased (inflated) UW NOI to make their
issued mortgages more attractive to investors. In the next section, I further
study the relationship between over-estimation and loan performance at the
originator level.
1.6 Does Over-estimation of NOI Affect Loan Perfor-
mance?
During the test for Hypothesis 2, I show the existence of large cross-
sectional differences in both over-estimation of NOI. In this section, I combine
that with loan performance and evaluate in detail how over-estimation affects
loan performance.
1.6.1 Large Cross-sectional Differences in Loan Performance among
Originators
Significant variations are found in the loan performance for mortgages
securitized from 1995-2006. For the same group of originators that have at
least 500 loans with available NOI data, the severe delinquency percentage
ranges from 3% (Wells Fargo) to as high as 15% (LaSalle).8
8There are originators with a higher average delinquency rate such as EMAC (21.9%).
This originator, along with others, is excluded in the regression analysis because the time
series of NOI data is not available.
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In order to get a clear picture about the performance difference, regres-
sion analysis is performed to study the originator fix effects with respect to
delinquency, controlling for loan characteristics, time, and location fixed effects
following Equation (1.7). Figure 10 shows the plot between the average delin-
quency rates and the coefficients of originator fixed effects from the regression.
They are highly correlated (correlation is 0.75). The triangle markers indicate
that the fixed effects are significant at a 5% level.
Delinquencyi = α0 + γControlsi +OriginatorFEs
+Y earQuarterFEs+ StateFEs+ i
(1.7)
1.6.2 Type of Originators
Several studies focus on the connection between the type of commercial
mortgage originator and loan performance as well as pricing. ? show that loans
originated by conduit lenders have a lower risk adjusted spread compared to
portfolio lenders. ? show that loans originated by commercial banks, insurance
companies, and finance companies have better performance compared to loans
originated by conduit lenders and foreign entities. In Figure 11, the top three
originators with high over-estimation (LaSalle, CIBC, and German American)
are all foreign entities and this aligns with the worst performing originators
documented in extant literature.
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1.6.3 Summary Analysis
In this section, I present and discuss two figures that show the rela-
tionship between over-estimation and delinquency aggregated by originators.
Figure 11 plots the average over-estimation and probability of delinquency by
originators. Figure 12 plots the coefficients of originator fixed effects from
regression on loan characteristics with over-estimation and delinquency as de-
pendent variables, respectively. Several observations are of further explana-
tion. First, both originator fixed effects have significant variation among each
other. Average over-estimation by originators ranges from -3% to 16% and
average delinquency by originators ranges from 3% to 15%. Second, average
over-estimation and delinquency at originator level are highly correlated. The
over-estimation of NOI seems to have a direct impact on originator loan perfor-
mance. Third, the coefficients of originator fixed effects tell us that, even after
controlling loan characteristics, state fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects,
both over-estimation (ranging from -2.7% to 8.2%) and delinquency (ranging
from -0.9% to 4.69%) still have large cross sectional differences. Moreover, the
correlation between fixed effects remains strong.
1.6.4 Regression Analysis
The previous section documented a clear correlation between originator
level over-estimation and delinquency. In this section, I quantify the magni-
tude of the impact of bias in UW NOI on loan performance. The obstacle
is to separate the bias in estimation of UW NOI from the over-estimation
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caused by randomness in the realized NOI. Here, I assume that the variations
in over-estimation within originators all attribute to bias in estimation for the
following reason: aggregating on an originator level and requiring each origi-
nator to have at least 500 loans ensure that randomness in the realized NOI
is cancelled out. In other words, I want to capture the effect from the ex-ante
biased estimation of UW NOI rather than the ex-post ”unlucky” poor realized
cash flow outcome.
I perform a logistic regression with the delinquency status as the depen-
dent variable to study the impact of over-estimation on delinquency following
Equation (1.8). Delinquency is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan
is delinquent for 90 days or more, in foreclosure, REO, default.
g(Delinquencyi) = α0 + βAvgOverByOrig + γControlsi
+Y earQuarterFEs+ StateFEs+ i
(1.8)
g(.) is the inverse of logistic function.
Models (1) and (2) in Table 6 show the results baseline model without
over-estimation. All samples with loan characteristics data available are in-
cluded in Model (1). Only samples whose originators have 500 or more loans
are included in Model (2). Comparing Model (1) and (2), the relationship
between delinquency status and loan characteristics are similar across two
samples. In general, loans with higher LTV, lower DSCR, higher loan balance,
higher coupon rate, fixed interest rate schedule, loans with multiple properties,
and slower or no amortization are more likely to be delinquent. The directions
of these impacts generally align with my expectations.
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The result in Table 6 Model (3) shows each 1% increase in average
over-estimation makes the loan 20% more likely to become seriously delin-
quent. Illustrating the magnitude of impact by two originators in our sample,
the difference in average over-estimation between LaSalle and Principle Com-
mercial Funding are 19% (16% and -3%); the discrepancy in over-estimation
translates to the observation that LaSalle’s loans are 380% (2000*0.19) more
likely to be delinquent than Principle Commercial Funding’s loans. The pre-
dicted difference in delinquency rates explains most of the difference in actual
delinquency: LaSalle: 15.2% vs. Principle Commercial Funding: 3.3% (460%
higher likelihood).
The surprisingly high impact on delinquency from originator level over-
estimation hints at the existence of other potential reporting also tied to orig-
inators. Due to data limitations, I am not able to examine all potential mis-
reporting.
1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Were Over-estimations Priced Sufficiently?
In the section where I tested Hypothesis 5, the results showed that
each 100% of over-estimation will increase the interest rate of the loan by 7
to 9 basis points after controlling for loan characteristics and fixed effects. It
is natural to think about the question of whether the difference in interest
rate is sufficient to compensate for the extra risk brought on by the over-
estimation of UW NOI. If the answer is yes, the misreporting is less of an
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issue since the investors of the mortgage, essentially the buyers of the CMBS,
get fair compensation for the additional risk. If the answer is no, it is a
meaningful empirical question to examine the magnitude of the losses suffered
by the investors in terms of the interest payment. ? show that the RMBS
investors were not fully compensated for the additional risk from misreporting
in residential mortgage.
I tackle the question through the following steps. First, I run a re-
gression to examine the impact from over-estimation on delinquency; I then
determine how much incremental delinquency brought was by a 10% (a ar-
bitrary number as an example) over-estimation through this step. Second, I
set an example of a “representative loan” with 67.1% for LTV and 1.72 for
DSCR. Hypothetically, if the UW NOI of the loan is not inflated by 10%, the
“corrected” LTV and DSCR changes to 73.81% and 1.56, respectively. Third,
I derive the “fair” compensation in terms of additional interest rate according
to a regression of interest rate on LTV, DSCR, and other loan characteristics.
Finally, I compare the “fair” compensation to the actual difference in interest
from the previous procedure.
Table 7 shows the regression results related to previous steps. The
changes in LTV and DSCR caused by inflated WU NOI (for 10%) demand
two basis points compensation in interest rate paid to investors. Compared
to the actual difference in interest rate difference, which is merely 0.7%-0.9%,
investors are far from fully-compensated for the additional risk related to the
over-estimation.
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1.7.2 Does Over-estimation Affect CMBS Ratings?
One distinction between the CMBS and RMBS credit rating process is
that the CMBS rating process involves more soft information and subjective
opinion than the RMBS rating process. According to public rating criteria
obtained from the Moody’s, S&P’s, and Fitch websites, all CMBS rating pro-
cesses involve a revaluation of the appraisal value. To be more specific, rating
agencies derive their own property values9 by consolidating information from
on-site visits, property specific research, proprietary capitalization rate mod-
els, and other information. The rating agencies may also adjust an originator’s
reported UW NOI following their own accounting standards and related crite-
ria. The rating models use their adjusted property value instead of the original
property value provided by the originator as final inputs for rating models.10
Thus, with the additional private information and evaluation procedures, the
rating agencies can potentially add value to the securitization process by giving
lower credit ratings to deals with high over-estimation.
Following other academic research, I use the AAA subordination level–
the percentage of the deal receiving non-AAA rating—as a measure for the
credit rating of a deal.11 I first need to show that there are substantial dif-
ferences in aggregate over-estimation among deals. In unreported results, the
9It is called S&P’s value for example.
10One public criteria released by Moody, notes the average adjustment is -20% compared
to the original appraisal value.
11When calculating the AAA subordination level, if there is a rating disagreement among
credit rating agencies, the highest rating is used.
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standard deviation in deal level over-estimation is 13.2%. One word, the deal
level delinquency is affected by the deal level over-estimation.
I test for the relationship between average over-estimation by deal and
AAA subordination level following Equation (1.9). The variable of interest
here is β1. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications to control for the
potential changes in market view, economic conditions, and rating criteria.
AAASubordinationLeveli = α0 + β1AvgOverbyDeali
+γControlsi + Y earQuarterFEs+ i
(1.9)
Table 8 shows the results for the regression analysis. Model (1) shows
that the base line regression result, which only includes the deal characteris-
tics, and the direction of coefficients are generally aligned with our expectation.
Model (2) shows the result with deal level over-estimation and it also shows
that the over-estimation does not have a significant impact on AAA subordina-
tion level. This suggests that all evaluations performed by the rating agencies
on the properties failed to capture the potential over-estimation, and thus,
the ratings are not affected by the aggregate level of over-estimation. Due
to concerns for low coverage on over-estimation, in Model (3), I compute the
over-estimation based on NOI on the following year instead of the origination
year. The average availability of the data increases from 52% to 72%. The
result remains the same.
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1.7.3 Robustness Check
In unreported results, I perform (but am not limited to) the following
robustness checks.
First, for calculation of over-estimation, I use the realized NOI one
year after origination year; this gives me a substantially larger sample. Main
results hold with the same revised measure. Second, I exclude newly-built
properties from the regressions because historically NOI are not available to
originators and borrowers, and thus, the UW NOI are harder to estimate. The
properties built with two years before origination contribute to less than 5%
of the whole sample and eliminating them from the main sample does not
significantly change results. Third, I adapt finer aggregations for location and
property type fixed effects in main regressions and the results hold.
1.8 Conclusion
Asymmetric information and adverse selection problems are the key
features in the structured finance market. Investors evidently have little capa-
bility and intention to perform due diligence to examine property level infor-
mation in mortgage-backed securities, especially when the securities do well.
Even after the financial crisis, little has been done to change the structure of
the market, Additionally issuance of CMBS quickly rose to its pre-crisis level.
In this Chapter, I examine the Underwritten Net Operating Income
(UW NOI) and other key financial variables for securitized commercial mort-
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gages. Before the financial crisis, the UW NOI was consistently overstated
by 7.8%. This overstatement lead to LTV being misreported as 67.1% from
84.2% and DSCR as 1.72 from 1.59. For the top seven-out-of-eighteen origina-
tors with at least 500 data available, the average over-estimation is 10.7% from
2003-2007. I then use five hypotheses testings to distinguish two competing
explanations for the over-estimation: an unexpectedly low realization of NOI
against biased UW NOI estimation. By showing evidence for the timing of the
over-estimation, cross-sectional differences in originator level over-estimation,
relationship between over-estimation and marginal benefit of inflating NOI,
responses of over-estimation to securitization thresholds, and impact of over-
estimation on initial interest rate, I reject the null hypotheses and conclude
that the over-estimation in UW NOI is at least partially caused by biased
estimation.
The over-estimation of UW NOI by originators appears to explain most
of the cross-sectional differences in loan performances after controlling for loan
characteristics, location, and time fixed effects. Substantial cross-sectional dif-
ferences in both average over-estimation and delinquency by originators exist
and these are highly correlated. The logistic regression analysis suggests that
each 1% increase in an originator’s over-estimation level leads to a 20% relative
increase in delinquency probability. I also examine the role of rating agencies
with respect to the over-estimation. It appears that the AAA subordination
levels do not respond to the deal level over-estimation. Rating agencies fail to
add values for investors through their credit ratings.
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Chapter 2
Identification and Estimation of Strategic
Credit Rating
2.1 Introduction
Rating agencies play a central role in the structured finance market.
They have largely been blamed for the recent financial crisis for failing to give
credit ratings that correctly measured the default risk of security. Due to the
complexity of the structured finance products and regulatory capital require-
ments, a majority of investors—including sophisticated institutional investors
such as pension funds and insurance companies—rely heavily on credit rat-
ings published by credit rating agencies for their investment decisions. Rating
inflation has been recognized as a major cause of the 2008 financial crisis by
recent studies, including, for example, ? and ?. Peer effects have been doc-
umented as the major concern for the conflict of interest in the credit rating
business model wherein credit rating agents compete with their peers for rat-
ing business while their revenues mainly come from the issuers whose financial
products are getting rated.1
1Two practical channels of peer effects have been discussed in the literature: that is,
rating shopping (see for example, ???) and rating catering (see for example, ???).
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In this chapter, I investigate rating agencies’ behaviors by using a
strategic interaction model and a dataset for Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Security (CMBS), originated before and after the 2008 financial crisis. Resi-
dential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS), Commercial Mortgage-Backed Se-
curity (CMBS), and Collateral Debt Obligation (CDO) all suffered tremendous
losses during the financial crisis.2 CMBS tranches initially granted with high
investment grades have experienced large scale downgrades (about 10 notches
on average) and defaults,3 so too have RMBS and CDO securities.
Following the literature, our empirical study focuses on non-agency
CMBS.4 The CMBS is a more attractive segment of the structured finance
market than RMBS and CDO to study the credit rating behaviors before and
after the financial crisis. The first advantage is that CMBS issuances have
largely recovered to their pre-crisis levels while (non-agency) RMBS and CDO
markets are at a small fraction of their pre-crisis levels.5 Second, the struc-
ture and risk profile of the underlying assets of CMBS deals issued after the
2Note that CDO specifically refers to CDO with mortgage–backed security as the main
underlying assets.
3A CMBS (or CMBS deal) is a large package of tranches backed by the same group of
commercial mortgages. A CMBS tranche is one piece of the securities offered in a CMBS
deal.
4Agency CMBS are issued by government-related entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. These securities have different risk profiles compared to non-agency Mortgage-Backed
Security and usually have an implicit or explicit guarantee on payments by the federal
government.
5According to data from Bloomberg, at the peak (i.e. 2006) before the crisis, the number
of CMBS, RMBS and CDO issued are 139, 1864 and 502, respectively. In 2013, the number
of CMBS, RMBS and CDO issued are 124, 120 and 8, respectively. Re-securitized RMBS
are not counted.
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financial crisis have generally remained the same as before the crisis, except for
some improvements in risk measures. In contrast, the underwritten criteria for
RMBS have tightened with improved scrutiny on borrowers’ soft information
(such as income documentations), which are not observable to the researcher.
Changes related to unobservable soft information make it difficult to compare
RMBS deals issued before and after the crisis even with all possible observable
loan risk characteristics. Moreover, the rebound in the CMBS market also
provides us with sizable post-crisis CMBS deals.
Peer effects play an important role in credit agencies’ rating behaviors,
see (e.g. ????, for the theoretic side). In our data, direct evidence exists
regarding strategic interactions in credit rating. First, most of the CMBS
tranches in our sample receive multiple ratings from different agencies, but
rating disagreements are surprisingly small. Before the financial crisis, the
SEC only qualified to participate in the CMBS rating market; this number
expanded to five after the crisis.6 Figure 13 presents the percentage of rating
disagreements by vintage. For CMBS issued before the crisis, on average
only 6% have any rating disagreement. Even fewer disagreements exist among
AAA rated tranches than those tranches with non-AAA ratings, where the
former is the most important composition of CMBS deals. Based on small
disagreements in Figure 13, it is hard to justify that the rating agencies perform
independent and objective evaluations of CMBS deals, albeit all agencies claim
6The agencies are S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, and DBRS. Kroll entered the market after the
financial crisis.
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they have their own proprietary rating models on CMBS according to the
publicly available CMBS rating criteria.7
The second piece of empirical evidence for the existence of peer effects is
described in Figure 14. Following the literature, we use the AAA subordination
level to measure the average rating of a CMBS deal. The AAA subordination
level is the proportion of tranches (bond) issued with a non-AAA rating, which
determines how much losses the CMBS can sustain before a AAA tranche
suffers any losses. Figure 14 shows the average AAA subordination level by
vintage, which decreases significantly after the financial crisis. Prior to the
financial crisis, the AAA subordination level remains low at about 15%; this
suggests that, on average, 85% of a CMBS deal is granted a AAA rating. After
the financial crisis, the AAA subordination level goes up dramatically to the
25% - 35% range. Meanwhile, the rise in subordination level is accompanied
by an improvement in loan quality, which is measured by the average severe
delinquency.8 Such a phenomena suggests that the rating agencies shift from
an inflated to a conservative rating equilibrium.
In extant literature, several studies explain the change in CMBS AAA
subordination level; all of these articles focus on pre-crisis deals. For example,
? study the determinate factors driving the AAA subordination levels. The
7For example, S&P’s “Rating Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. And Cana-
dian CMBS” is available through this link. https://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/
ratings/articles/en/us?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245380021782
8Severe delinquency is defined as the sum of delinquency for at least 90 days, foreclosure
and REO.
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authors show that these levels have a weak relation with ex-post or ex-ante
measures of credit risk and are mainly driven by factors not related to risk,
such as supply and demand on securities, deal complexity, and issuer incentive.
? mainly focus on the change in investors’ demand for CMBS tranche with
investment grades. They attribute the decline in AAA subordination level
to the loosening of capital requirements following a regulatory change. That
article also shows that the reduction in subordination level before the financial
crisis has little to do with the change in risk characteristics of the underlying
CMBS deals.
In this chapter, we model the CMBS credit ratings as strategic behav-
iors that reflect the peer effects from other rating agencies. We incorporate
the interaction from other rating agencies through the estimation on market
“beliefs” on the ratings. In our model, the beliefs are estimated separately
before and after crisis controlling for risk characteristics. A significant shift
(in both statistic and economic senses) before and after the crisis triggered the
existence of multiple equilibria in the rating market. By including the strategic
interaction term, we establish semiparametric identification and estimation of
the interaction–based model. Our identification method follows the idea in a
germinal paper by ?. Specifically, we exploit the variations in beliefs before
and after the US subprime mortgage crisis to identify the peer effects coeffi-
cient. We further estimate the structural model by a two–step procedure. By
including peer effects, the fitness of our model has been significantly improved.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 ad-
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dresses the data and characteristics of a CMBS deal. Section 3 introduces our
benchmark model and establishes the identification of the structural model
using equilibrium shift before and after the financial crisis. We also provide
empirical evidence for the equilibrium shift after controlling for risk character-
istics. Section 4 proposes a two–step estimation procedure using the pooled
cross-section. Finally, Section 5 reports the empirical results and Section 6
concludes.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Sample Description
Data on CMBS deals come from Bloomberg. We focus on US non-
agency CMBS deals issued between January 2000 and May 2014. For various
reasons, some important characteristics are missing for a proportion of obser-
vations. For instance, private placement CMBS deals do not publicize detailed
deal information, since this is not required by the SEC. We eliminate deals
with missing risk characteristic information, which results in a final sample of
632 deals. Our sample covers about 51% of the 1,246 deals issued during the
sample period. We classify deals issued in and after 2009 as post-financial-crisis
issues, leading to 442 pre-crisis and 190 post-crisis deals.
Figure 15 presents the total number of deals issued and the number of
deals included in our sample indexed by year. Clearly, dramatic changes are
recorded in the CMBS market after the financial crisis. For example, in our
sample, the number of deals issued dropped from 139 deals in 2006 to only
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21 deals in 2008 and 22 deals in 2009. After the crisis, accompanied by a
low interest rate environment and re-finance of matured loans, the CMBS deal
issuance recovered to the pre-crisis level in 2013 with 117 issued deals.
2.2.2 Deal Characteristics
Table 9 reports the summary statistics of the AAA Subordination Level
and CMBS deal characteristics in our sample. The AAA Subordination Level
is the sum of the balances of non-AAA tranches divided by the total balance
of the deal. It represents the maximum amount of percentage loss the deal
can sustain before allocating any losses to a AAA rated tranche. Figure 14
shows the time series of average AAA Subordination Level by year of issuance
(vintage). The subordination level had been steadily trending down before
the financial crisis. The decrease in CMBS subordination level is almost 10%
between 2000 (23.2%) and 2008 (13.5%), which implies that, on average, the
CMBS deals issued in 2008 may sustain 10% less loss than 2000 deals. The
AAA subordination level went back up after the financial crisis to more than
30% in 2013 and 2014, accompanied by fundamental changes in loan quality,
as shown in the following paragraphs.
We use a host of deal-level characteristics in our CMBS rating analysis.
The first two characteristics are loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-service
coverage ratio (DSCR). Table 9 shows that the pre-crisis deals are more risky
in terms of LTV and less risky in terms of DSCR. These two variables are
widely considered to be strong predictors of mortgage defaults for commercial
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mortgages. In particular, high LTV or low DSCR is related to risky commercial
mortgage. Thus, we expect that a high LTV or a low DSCR relates to a high
subordination level, all things being equal.
The third characteristic is the amortization schedule. Commercial
mortgages, unlike residential mortgages, are mostly not fully-amortized (i.e.
loan balance does not go to zero on maturity). In this case, borrowers need to
pay full or partial principle at maturity, which leads to a higher default risk. ?
find that full-interest-only loans have higher default rates than partial-interest-
only or fully amortized loans. We categorize commercial mortgages in CMBS
into three groups: interest-only (no amortization at all), partial-interest-only
(some but not full amortization), and full amortization loans. Table 9 shows
the shares of full interest-only loans and partial interest-only loans. The share
of fully amortized loans equals to one minus sum of these two former cate-
gories. More full interest-only loans exist pre-crisis, which suggests pre-crisis
deals are more risky in this measure.
The fourth characteristic of interest is the number of loans. All things
being equal, deals with a larger number of loans are less risky, and therefore
imply lower subordination levels. The number of loans and effective number
of loans derived from the Herfindahl index are used in rating models by credit
rating agencies. As shown in Table 9, the number of loans are higher after the
crisis.
The fifth characteristic is deal balance, defined as the original balance
of the deal. ? note that large deals tend to have more complex structures
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and worse performance. The average size of a CMBS deal is 1.5 billion USD;
post-crisis deals are, on average, smaller.
The sixth characteristic is deal spread, defined as the difference between
the weighted average coupon (WAC) of the deal and the 10-year treasury yield.
The latter is deemed a risk-free interest rate. The spread will be positively
related to the risk of the deal and it is expected to be positively correlated with
subordination level. The spread is higher for pre-crisis deals, which suggests
that these deals are more risky.
Finally, we consider property type to be a potential determinant of
CMBS rating because, during the appraisal process, property type affects the
capitalization rate. We categorize properties into five types: office, retail,
hotel, industrial, and multifamily property. Typically, multifamily properties
are viewed as the least risky while hotel and industrial properties are the most
risky. As shown in Table 9, more office property and multifamily and less
retail and hotel property loans are securitized after the crisis.
2.3 Model
A CMBS deal consists of a large group of mortgage assets, characterized
by x ∈ Rd. For any given CMBS deal, a credit rating agency chooses a
percentage p ∈ [0, 1], a proportion of the deal, to receive the top rating (AAA).
For instance, suppose p = 85%. Then, the 85% of the assets that have the
lowest default risk in the tranche receive AAA. To decide on the percentage,
an agency takes into account the characteristics of the deal x, his own private
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information , and potentially other agencies’ ratings.
In this paper, we consider the following model to approximate an
agency’s choice
p = h∗(x, pe, ) (2.1)
where h∗ is a (nonparametric) structural function and pe is the market “beliefs”
on the rating. A solution to (2.1) is a function: p = p(x, ) that satisfies (2.1)
with pe = E(p(x, )|x). Each solution constitutes an equilibrium. By the self-
consistency of rational expectations (see for example, ?), we have pe = E(p|x)
when there is a unique equilibria.9 In the presence of multiple equilibrium (see
for example, ?), we have pe = E(p|x, t) where t is the equilibrium selection
mechanism to be introduced later.
The impact of pe on p reflects the peer effects on the credit rating: a
rating agency is inclined to choose a higher percentage given that all of her
peers rate higher on similar mortgage assets. Due to such an effect, the credit
rating agencies behave strategically while factoring in the expected market
outcome. This type of econometric model was first suggested by ?? in the
context of social interactions. In credit rating literature, ? developed a the-
oretic credit rating model with regulation, where peer effects among credit
agencies are modeled through the relative performance evaluation mechanism.
In Model (2.1), we use a nonparametric function h∗ to model rating
agencies’ decisions. Regarding the empirical analysis of strategic behaviors,
9In this case, we can obtain market beliefs pe by solving the nonlinear equation pe =∫
R h
∗(x, pe, )dF|x.
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nonparametric analysis has become central in economics for several reasons.
First, game theoretic models on strategic interactions are usually silent on the
parametric form of strategic effects. The introduction of additional parametric
specifications, especially on the form of strategic effects, without careful justi-
fications may lead to spurious identification and mislead empirical conclusions.
In contrast, the general specification of (2.1) helps emphasize the role of an
equilibrium shift on the identification of peer effects. For estimation, how-
ever, we will make additional parametric assumptions later for the purpose of
simplification. Second, note that the dependent variable is a ratio between 0
and 1. It is well known that the usual linear specification is not proper for
modeling limited dependent variables.
The empirical analysis of rating agencies’ strategic behaviors using (2.1)
involves two obstacles. First, the market “beliefs” pe on the rating are not
observed in the data. Second, the dependent variable p is limited to the
interval [0, 1]. Since the former is a much deeper problem, we first deal with
the latter in the following analysis.
We propose a transformation to the limited dependent variable, p.
Without loss of generality, we let Φ be the CDF of the standard normal dis-
tribution.10 Thus, (2.1) can be rewritten as
p = Φ(h(x, pe, )). (2.2)
10Another popular alternative is the logistic distribution function, exp(·)/[1 + exp(·)].
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where h = Φ−1(h∗). Under the transformation, our model can be written as
Φ−1(p) = h(x, pe, )
for which the new dependent variable Φ−1(p) is not limited. Note that our
transformation technique is related to the so–called Box–Cox transformation
literature (see for example, ?). It is worth pointing out that our method is
robust to the choice of the transformation function Φ. It is even possible to
permit an unknown transformation function, but at the cost of complicating
the arguments.
After dealing with the limited dependent variable issue, we introduce
additional weak assumptions.
Assumption A (additivity). Let h(x, pe, ) = β(x) + αpe + , where α ∈ R,
β : Rd → R.
Assumption B (mean independence). Let E(|x) = 0.
Assumptions A and B are standard in empirical game literature. Specifically,
assumption A requires that strategic effects from peers’ credit rating behaviors
can be represented by a constant coefficient α. A more general form of strategic
effects is allowed (e.g., ?) at the expositional expense. Assumption B is strong,
but indispensable in econometrics literature.11
11It should also be noted that assumption B can be replaced by the quantile independence
condition and then we can use the quantile regression approach for inference; see for example,
?.
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Under assumptions A and B, our model becomes
Φ−1(p) = β(x) + αpe + , (2.3)
with E(|x) = 0. ? describes Equation (2.3) as a structure with the “reflection
problem.” Specifically, the market beliefs pe on the right hand of the equation
is given by the conditional distribution of p given x, while p as the dependent
variable depends on pe. This introduces a simultaneity issue.
2.3.1 Multiple Equilibria
Simultaneity might introduce multiple solutions to (2.3), that is, all
the rating agencies simultaneously inflate their credit ratings, (2.3) remains
to hold. Fix the value of x. Let E (x) ≡ {p1(x, ), · · · , pK(x, )} be the set of
solutions that solve (2.3), where K = K(x) denotes the number of equilibria.
Thus, for k = 1, · · · , K, Assumption B implies: each equilibrium solution
pk(x, ) in E (x) needs to satisfy the following self-consistency conditions:
E
[
Φ−1(pk(x, ))|x
]
= β(x) + αE(pk(x, )|x). (2.4)
In the following discussion, we show that the presence of the multiple
equilibria and the non-degeneracy of the equilibrium selection mechanism are
crucial for the empirical analysis of our model. Empirical evidence also shows
the shift of the equilibrium before and after the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis.
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2.3.2 Identification
Following ? and ?, the identification concept here is treated as the limit
of statistic inference: given an infinite number of observations, can we recover
the structural parameters α and β(·)? If the answer is negative, then there
is no hope to estimate α or β(·) using any finite sample. In our model, all of
the information contained in an infinite sample is the conditional distribution
Fp|x of rating given the deal characteristics. We then wonder whether we can
obtain α and β(·) from Fp|x? We consider our model to be identified if and
only if the answer to this question is confirmed.
We now argue that α is not identified when there is a unique equi-
librium, that is, for given distribution Fp|x of observables, multiple values of
the structural parameters (α, β(·)) that deliver the observed distribution Fp|x
exist. To see this, suppose the data come from one single equilibrium, either
because of the uniqueness of the equilibrium, or the same equilibrium being se-
lected all the time. Thus, we have pe = E(p|x) which can be directly identified
from the given distribution Fp|x. Difficulty arises when it comes to identify-
ing α and β using variations in x, pe and E
[
Φ−1(p)|x], since pe is restricted
to be fixed if x has been controlled for. Mathematically, our model implies
one equation, Equation (2.4), but two unkonwns, α and β(·). One can show
that any structure {α, β(·)} is observationally equivalent to the structure with
α˜ = 0 and β˜(x) = β(x) +αE(p|x). Intuitively, we cannot distinguish the cases
with and without peer effects: the rating agencies might take into account
each other’s ratings and the analyst explains the observed data perfectly well
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if he/she attributes all variations to the nonstrategic term, β(x).
When there are multiple equilibria and different equilibria gets played
at different time periods, we have an extra dimension of variation that gives
multiple conditional distributions: Fp|x,t, where t denotes a time period. As
a result, the nonstrategic term β(x) itself is no longer able to explain all the
data variations. Suppose different equilibria have been adopted by the credit
rating market at t = 0, 1, where t = 0 and 1 denote before and after the 2008
financial crisis, respectively. With slight abuse of our notation, let pt(x, )
be the equilibrium strategy played for a given CMBS characterized by x at
period t. Let further pe(x, t) = E(pt(x, )|x, t). Therefore, we can specify our
econometric model for equilibrium credit rating decision as follows:
p = pt(x, ), for t = 0, 1; (2.5)
Φ−1(p) = β(x) + αE(p|x, t) + . (2.6)
By (2.6), equilibrium beliefs pe(x, t) can still have variations even after we
control for x. This is because from t = 0 to 1, the financial crisis has shifted
the market equilibrium. The next lemma summarizes the above discussion.
Lemma 1. We maintain assumptions A and B. Suppose for each x the data
come from one single equilibrium. Then, the structural parameters α and β(·)
are not identified. Moreover, suppose for some x the data come from two
different equilibria before and after the financial crisis and pe(x, 0) 6= pe(x, 1).
Then α and β(·) are identified.
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Note that the identification rank condition pe(x, 0) 6= pe(x, 1) is testable, since
E(p|x, t) can be non-parametrically estimated.12 The non-identification result
in Lemma 1 is essential, which reflects the fact that all of the variations in the
data are not sufficient to identify peer effects when the equilibrium does not
change if we control for x.
Lemma 1 illustrates the extent to which the fully parametric estimation
strategy is relying on the parametric structure for identification or merely
for feasibility of estimation. Without equilibrium shifts due to the financial
crisis, the estimation of peer effects in a fully parametric setting is misleading.
For instance, one may consider a parametric version of our model: Φ−1(p) =
x′β+αpet+, where  ∼ N(0, 1). One could use maximum likelihood estimation
approach to estimate coefficients (α, β′)′. Such an estimate, however, heavily
relies on linearity and is not robust to even small model mis-specifications.
In other words, one can not treat the linear-index specification simply as an
approximation for simplicity of the inference.
Additionally, Lemma 1 also emphasizes the role of the multiple equilib-
ria for empirical inference. Such an identification approach is first introduced
in a germinal paper by ? for identification and estimation of the sign of strate-
gic effects. For such a reason, the non–linearity relationship between p and pe
in (2.3) is crucial for the identification of peer effects coefficient α. In contrast,
? discussed some difficulties in the empirical analysis of peer effects in a linear
12We only need the rank condition hold for one value of x, not every x on its support.
Such a rank condition is quite weak.
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setting, which typically admits a unique equilibrium solution. Specifically, the
reflection issue makes inference difficult to impossible. Because of this reason,
the simpler linear specification is
p = β(x) + αpe + ,
which is not appealing if we observe multiple equilibria in the data.
2.3.3 Empirical evidence of multiple equilibria
Given the important role played by multiple equilibria in our identifi-
cation strategy, we now present some empirical evidence for such an existence
in the CMBS market during 2002-2014.
First, Figure 14 in the previous section shows significant increases in
AAA subordination levels after 2008. For each CMBS, the AAA subordination
level is defined as the proportion of the deal that receives a rating below AAA.
By definition, the AAA subordination level of a deal i equals to 1−pi. Clearly,
the AAA subordination level increases from about 15% to more than 30% after
the crisis. The spectacular failure of the top-rated Mortgage-Backed Security
raised investors’ and regulators’ attention to the inflation of credit ratings
before the crisis. Consequently, agencies switched to a more conservative rating
mechanism.
Next, we control for the risk of CMBS deals and examine whether evi-
dence exists for the shift of equilibrium before and after the crisis. Specifically,
we construct both ex-ante and ex-post measures for the risk. While holding
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risk fixed, we investigate the AAA subordination level for each CMBS before
and after the crisis.
We use the two most important original deal level risk-related charac-
teristics, loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR),
as ex-ante risk measures. Then, we examine their relationship with the AAA
subordination level before and after the crisis. Figures 16 and 17 demonstrate
the non-parametric estimation for the mean of the AAA subordination level
given LTV and DSCR, respectively. Note that deals issued after crisis on aver-
age have lower LTV and higher DSCR, which suggests that, roughly speaking,
deals after crisis are safer than pre-crisis deals. In both Figures 16 and 17,
however, the mean estimates of the AAA subordination level given LTV and
DSCR after the crisis are always significantly higher than those before the
crisis. Therefore, safer CMBS deals after the crisis receive smaller proportions
of the AAA ratings than deals before crisis.
Higher macroeconomic risk might be associated with the mortgage as-
sets after the crisis, which could also affect the credit rating in a negative way.
To control for such effects, we also use the delinquency rate as the ex-post
risk measure and examine how it is related to the AAA subordination level
before and after the crisis. In particular, we focus on the third year (after its
issuance) delinquency rate of a deal. The delinquency rate is defined as the
sum of delinquency for at least 90 days, foreclosure, and real estate owned
(REO). Intuitively, the delinquency rate summarizes all the ex-post risk in-
formation associated with a deal. The Bloomberg data allows us to observe
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the monthly updated delinquency rates for each deal after its issuance. Alter-
natively, one can also use the fifth year delinquency rate or a measure with a
longer duration. The results are quite similar.
Figure 18 presents the scatter plot for the AAA subordination level and
delinquency rate for each deal issued before and after crisis in our sample. For
deals issued after crisis (blue dots), the support of the third year delinquency
rate is close to degenerate, that is, most deals after 2008 have zero delinquency.
Hence, these assets are quite safe. However, the average AAA subordination
level is 29.0%, which is significantly higher than 16.3% of assets before the
crisis. However, the latter are associated with higher third year delinquency
rates. Importantly, the correlation between the AAA subordination level and
the delinquency rate is low, which is consistent with the findings in ?.
Given the empirical evidence discussed above, the CMBS deals issued
after the crisis are generally less risky but, on average, granted with lower
ratings. As a risk measurement, clearly the AAA subordination level shifts
from an inflated to a conservative rating equilibrium.
2.4 Estimation Procedure
As emphasized above, the peer effects coefficient α can be identified if
and only if the equilibrium shifts from one to another in the data. We now
discuss how to estimate α from an iid pooled cross-sectional random sample
{(pi, xi, ti) : i = 1, · · · , n}. To obtain a precise estimator, we further impose
a parametric specification on the nonstrategic part β(·) as an approximation,
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which allows us to estimate α at the regular
√
n-rate. Specifically, let β(x) =
x′β0 for some β0 ∈ Rd. We further denote θ0 = (α0, β′0)′ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd+1, where Θ
is a compact parameter space. Hence, our econometric model becomes:
Φ−1(p) = x′β0 + α0pe(x, t) + . (2.7)
where pe(x, t) = E(p|x, t).
We now proceed to motivate and describe our estimation procedure.
Note that (2.7) is a typical transformed regression equation, albeit that we do
not observe pe(xi, ti) directly. In the first stage, we nonparametrically estimate
it by pˆe(xi, ti) = ψˆi/σˆi, where
σˆi =
1
(n− 1)hd
∑
j 6=i
K
(
xj − xi
h
)
· 1(tj = ti),
ψˆi =
1
(n− 1)hd
∑
j 6=i
pj ·K
(
xj − xi
h
)
· 1(tj = ti),
where K : Rd → R and h ∈ R are kernel function and bandwidth, respectively.
Note that the above kernel estimator leaves the i-th observation out, which is
standard in the kernel estimation literature. ? state conditions under which
the nonparametric estimator pˆe(xi, ti) is consistent and asymptotically normal
distributed.13
In the second stage, we regress Φ−1(p) on x and the generated regressor
pˆe(x, t). Similarly to ?, we introduce a weighting function to avoid the trim-
ming issue introduced by the first stage nonparametric kernel estimation, that
13Alternatively, one can use the series expansion approach to estimate pe(xi, ti); see ?.
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is, the denominator σˆi might be close to zero for some observations with small
densities of x. Specifically, using σˆi as the weighting function, our estimator
has a form of the weighted least squares estimator as the following:
θˆ =
(
n∑
i=1
σˆ2i wˆiwˆ
′
i
)−1 n∑
i=1
σˆ2i wˆiΦ
−1(pi), (2.8)
where wˆi = (pˆ
e(xi, ti), x
′
i)
′.
We now establish the consistency and asymptotic normality of the pro-
posed estimator under the homoskedasticity assumption. The difficulty comes
from the fact that one regressor pˆe(xi, ti) is obtained from the nonparametric
kernel estimate.
Assumption C (homoskedasticity). Let E(2|x) = σ2 <∞.
Theorem 1. Suppose conditions in Lemma 1 and assumption C hold. Let
{(pi, xi, ti) : i = 1, · · · , n} be an iid random sample. Moreover, let h→ 0 and
√
nhd →∞ as n→∞. Then θˆ p→ θ0 and
√
n(θˆ − θ0) d→ N(0,Σ)
where Σ is defined in Appendix 1.2.
Proof. See Appendix 1.2.
Because the equilibrium beliefs pe(xi, ti) is estimated by pˆ
e(xi, ti) in the first
stage, this will induce some efficiency loss, that is, our estimator θˆ is less
efficient than the infeasible estimator that is obtained by replacing pˆe(xi, ti)
with pe(xi, ti) in (2.8).
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2.4.1 Implementation in R
We utilize the np package14 in R to perform the estimation in the
following steps.
First, I estimate pet by utilizing kernel regression function npreg. Two
separate kernel regressions are performed for t = 1, 2. All deal characteristics
showed in Table 9 are included in the regression. Second order Gaussian
kernel is applied. Second, I estimate σi of by utilizing kernel density estimation
function npudens. Two separate estimations are performed for t = 1, 2. Second
order Gaussian kernel is applied. Finally, I estimate Equation (2.7) by an OLS
regression. The dependent variable is Φ−1(p) and the independent variables
include pˆet and loan characteristics with σˆi as the regression weights.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 First Stage
Figure 19 presents the result for kernel estimation at the first stage.
Two separate kernel regressions are performed for t = 0, 1. This Figure plots
the relationship between p and pˆet . The dots are concentrated around a 45
degree line and this suggests the non-parametric model has a good fit. The
coefficients of determination are 98.5% before financial crisis and 88.7% af-
ter financial crisis. It is interesting to note that the standard error for the
estimation is low, especially for deals issued before the crisis.
14?
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2.5.2 Second Stage
Table 10 presents the result for the main estimation. Model (1) shows
the results for benchmark regression without pet . The signs of the impact of risk
characteristics on Φ−1(p) are as expected with some exceptions. An increase
in LTV ratio reduces the proportion of AAA rated tranche. The impact of
DSCR is the opposite of what we expect. The possible explanation is that, if
a loan is approved with low DSCR (corresponding to low debt paying ability),
the lender may have other information regarding the loans which may make
him believe that the borrower is able to meet the payment with a low DSCR
(?). Regarding amortization, if a CMBS deal has a bigger proportion of zero
and negative amortization loan, the deal is treated as more risky and has less
AAA rated tranche. A deal with higher number of loans enjoys diversification
benefits, which leads to higher p. Larger deals tend to have higher p as well.
Model (2) presents the estimation results following equation (2.7). First
of all, the coefficient on pet is highly significant and positive. The adjusted R
2 is
improved from 61 to 93%. This suggests that the model fits much better than
the benchmark regression. Second, most coefficients of the loan characteristics
are no longer significant. This suggests that the first stage estimator pet with
the post crisis dummy explains almost all the variation in AAA subordination
level among deals. Moreover, we provide a robust check by including the
delinquency at third year as one of the explanatory variables in Model (3).
The results are quite similar to those in Model (2). We further investigate
how our results are sensitive to the choice of transformation function Φ−1(·).
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In Models (1’), (2’) and (3’), we switch to the logit transformation and the
results are qualitatively similar.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have modeled an agency’s rating choice as an in-
complete information game with multiple equilibria. We use an exogenous
equilibrium shift to identify peer effects in credit rating behaviors. We then
apply our method to data on non-agency CMBS deals issued between January
2000 and May 2014. First, we document evidence of an equilibrium shift before
and after the 2008 financial crisis. Specifically, using various ex-ante measures
of risk, we find that the post-crisis deals are generally less risky but, on aver-
age, granted with lower ratings. This result is robust to ex-post measures of
risk. Second, we estimate our model using a two-step procedure. After con-
trolling for a host of deal-level characteristics, the inclusion of the peer effects
significantly improve the fitness of our model. Our empirical results provide
strong evidence of positive peer effects.
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Chapter 3
Impact of the Introduction of Competition in
the Credit Rating Market
3.1 Introduction
Credit ratings provide information regarding the default probability to
investors and allow investors to quickly make investment decisions on complex
structured finance products, which are backed by hundreds or thousands of
assets. The regulators also strictly follow the credit rating to set capital reserve
requirements for financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies.
Many institutional investors such as pension funds and money market funds
utilize credit ratings to govern their risk management. These attributions
make the credit ratings crucial to the financial market. However, during the
2008 financial crisis, structured finance products—which were initially given
AAA or high investment-grade ratings—suffered large scale downgrades and
defaults. Credit rating agencies were largely blamed for the mismatch between
the high level of credit ratings and poor performance of these securities. As
a response to the financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law.
The Act aimed to cure the problem by introducing more competition into
the credit rating market. Prior to the crisis, only three rating agencies were
certified by the SEC as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
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(NRSROs). The number has quickly climbed to ten as of March 2015. Among
current NRSROs, five rating agencies are actively engaged in the CMBS credit
rating market. Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA), the entrant rating agency,
quickly gained market share and surpassed the incumbents.1 After KBRA
rated its first CMBS in 2011, its CMBS rating market share quickly rose to
20% in 2012. It has maintained and grown from that level ever since.
The main research question I intend to answer is how the entrant be-
haved in terms of the ratings issued after they entered the market. To be more
specific, I study how KBRA competed against the incumbent rating agencies,
whether the ratings issued by the entrant are more lenient or stringent, and
whether the entrant gained market share through more favorable ratings. I
first study these securities rated by both the entrant and incumbent rating
agencies. More than 13.8% of these securities are granted with higher ratings
from the KBRA than another rating agency.
Evidence for rating disagreement alone may not be sufficient to prove
KBRA’s leniency since the securities they rated could be intrinsically safer
than those rated by the incumbents. I further perform two additional analyses
using deal level and loan level CMBS data to support the evidence. In the
first test, I use AAA subordination level as a measure for the average rating of
a CMBS and I show that CMBS rated by the entrant were given with a 2.25%
1In this study, Morningstar, the rating agency, was formerly an investor-paid but entered
the CMBS rating market after acceptance into NRSROs. The market share of Morningstar
is much lower compared to the entrant (KBRA) in the study. Morningstar is ignored in this
study due to data availability.
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larger portion of AAA ratings compared to CMBS rated by another rating
agency. In the second test, I utilize seasoned CMBS loans issued prior to the
crisis to develop delinquency prediction models. Across all model variations,
commercial loans securitized into deals rated by KBRA are predicted to have
about 10% higher likelihood to go delinquent compared to other loans. These
two pieces of evidence strongly support the case that KBRA systematically
gave its CMBS higher ratings while the underlying loans were substantially
more risky.
The results of this study have an important policy implication for reg-
ulators. Results show that, under current market situation and the issuer pay
model, the introduction of new rating agencies does not necessarily improve
rating quality. Increasing competition among rating agencies is likely to lead
to more space rating shopping and catering behaviors, and consequently causes
rating inflation. It seems that the elimination of rating shopping and catering
behaviors, and the alteration of the issuer pay model would likely lead to a
significant improvement in rating quality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The subsequent
section provides institutional background and explains the related empirical
and theocratical literature on how competition may affect ratings. Section
3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the methodology and the results
following by a conclusion.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 How does competition affect the credit rating market?
Compared to other segments of the structured finance market, CMBS
are the most suitable type of security for studying the impact of competition.
First, CMBS are part of the structured products that suffered tremendous
losses during the financial crisis.2 However, unlike RMBS and CDO, the new
CMBS issuance quickly recovered close to its pre-crisis level despite the intense
scrutiny by the market.3 The issuance recovery gives both the incumbents
and entrant the space to compete, and the prospective growth makes it more
attractive for all rating agencies to establish and expand their market shares.
Second, the CMBS rating process, compared to RMBS and CDO, is deemed
more subjective and less quantitative. Thus, the flexibility in the rating process
facilitates credit rating agencies’ differentiation of their ratings when facing
interactions with other market participants. Third, the structure and risk
profile of the underlying assets of the CMBS deals issued before and after
the crisis generally have remained the same while RMBS and CDO markets
have undergone structural changes that are unobservable to the researcher.
This feature of the CMBS market is essential for my analysis, which uses
performance information prior to the crisis to measure the risk of CMBS issued
after the crisis.
2The average downgrade for CMBS issued from 2005-2008 was ten grades.
3According to data from Bloomberg, at the peak (i.e. 2006) before the crisis, the number
of CMBS, RMBS, and CDO issued are 139, 1864 and 502, respectively. In 2013, the number
of CMBS, RMBS and CDO issued are 124, 120, and 8, respectively. (Re-securitized RMBS
are not counted.)
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The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act, the most significant change to
financial regulation following the financial crisis, was to promote competition
among credit rating agencies by recognizing more agencies with NRSRO sta-
tus. The Act sought to “improve ratings quality for the protection of investors
and in the public interest by fostering accountability, transparency, and com-
petition in the credit rating industry.”4 As of March 2015, ten organizations
were designated as NRSORs, compared to merely three prior to the financial
crisis.5 However, the reform did little if anything for the conflict of interest
regarding the revenue sources of rating agencies, that is, the issuer-pay model.
The regulatory body has claimed that the introduction of more compe-
tition helps to improve rating quality. However, both empirical and theoretical
literature hardly support this claim. Empirical evidence mainly supports the
idea that competition tends to lower the rating quality. ? use the acceptance
of DBRS to NRSROs as an event and show that SEC recognition leads to a
corporate bond yields change in the direction implied by DBRS’s rating. The
paper also suggests that this acceptance reduces the informativeness of the
entry’s rating since the ratings issued by DBRS are more similar to the other
incumbent agencies after becoming a NRSRO. ? utilize the recapitalization
of Fitch as a material entry of the third player to the two agencies market in
corporate bond rating. Their study shows that the increased competition co-
4Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany
S. 3850, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, S. Report No. 109-326, 109th Cong.,
2d Sess. (September 6, 2006) (Senate Report), p. 1.
5http://www.sec.gov/ocr.
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incides with lower rating quality from the incumbents, which is demonstrated
by the inflation of ratings, lower correlation between ratings and market yield,
and the lowered ability of ratings to predict default. In contrast, ? show
S&P’s issued more stringent ratings than the incumbents when it entered a
particular segment of the corporate bond market in 2000.
On the theoretical side, ? suggest that more competition can lead to
lower rating quality as the increased number of agencies facilitate rating shop-
ping under the current issuer-pay model. ? develop a repeated game model
and show that competition can induce inflated rating unless the entrant rating
agency has a higher reputation than the incumbent. Their study suggests the
likelihood that the entrant starts off with a low reputation (and market share)
and this low reputation incentivizes them to gain market share by inflating
the ratings.
3.2.2 Channels for interactions between credit rating agencies and
CMBS issuers.
Two main practical channels of interactions between credit rating agen-
cies and security issuers are discussed in the literature; these channels have
meaningful implications about how competition potentially changes rating
quality. The first scenario is called “rating shopping” (see for example, ???).
In a pure rating shopping situation, the issuers solicit preliminary ratings (also
called shadow ratings) from multiple rating agencies and pick the most favor-
able one(s). However, the rating agencies do not deviate from their rating
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criteria to generate biased ratings. The second channel is “rating catering,”
which refers to the situation wherein rating agencies deviate from their pre-
set rating criteria and give inflated ratings in order to compete for market
share against other rating agencies (see for example, ???). The key distinc-
tion from rating shopping is that, in rating catering, the rating agencies alter
their models to generate higher ratings for business concerns.
Implications of the increased competition on rating quality through
each of these channels are certainly debatable. Additional rating agencies
offer issuers a larger number of rating agencies from which to shop. Conse-
quently, this may lead to inflated rating by rating shopping alone.6 Moreover,
competition may increase the value of the incumbents’ reputation and, thus,
improve the quality of the rating.
3.2.3 This Chapter
In a contemporaneous and independent study, ? focus on the same
entrant event and they analyze the impact of the entry of new credit rating
agencies on rating levels. They document similar evidence of the market share
change after the financial crisis as well as the comparison of ratings between
the entrants and the incumbents. In comparison, my paper draws a more
conclusive result beyond the scope of their research by using two separate
deal level and loan level analyses with controls for underlying risk level of the
6It is worth noting that Dodd-Frank Act intended to suppress rating shopping behav-
ior by mandating rating agency to report all solicited preliminary ratings. However, the
enforcement of the mandate is up for debate.
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security. My study shows that the entrant granted higher ratings in spite of
the more risky underlying assets.
In sum, the impact of competition on rating quality remains an empir-
ical question. In this chapter, I examine how the entrant in the CMBS market
behaves with respect to their ratings and market share changes.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Rating Scale
All the rating agencies have comparable rating scale within each other.
Although ratings may be expressed by slightly different wordings in their rating
criteria, they all have same number of different ratings and the ratings are
treated by regulators in the same manner. In Table 11, I map the alphabetical
ratings from each of the five rating agencies to numerical values. I assign the
highest possible rating, AAA, with value 23; the second highest rating AA+ is
assigned with 22, and so on. Note that the value 2 corresponds to “default” and
value 1 corresponds to “not rated.” All initial ratings of CMBS tranches are
between AAA and B-. Ratings higher than BBB- (including BBB-) are called
investment grades, which are in general treated as safe assets by investors and
regulators.
3.3.2 Sample
CMBS data are obtained from Bloomberg Professional. In this chapter,
I focus on the U.S. non-agency CMBS deals issued between January 2011 and
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May 2014. The initial credit ratings are available for five rating agencies
(S&P’s, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS, and KBRA). However, for various reasons, 69
out of 246 deals miss deal level risk characteristics. The majority of deals with
missing variables are private placement CMBS deals, since the publication of
the deal prospectus is not required by the SEC for this particular type of
issuance.
Bloomberg has deal level, tranche level, and loan level data coverage
for CMBS. In this study, I utilize all three levels of this data. Deal level
data mainly cover the aggregated risk related information such as Loan-to-
Value (LTV) ratio, Debt-Service coverage ratio (DSCR), original deal bal-
ance, weighted average coupon (WAC), amortization term, and number of
loans. Tranche level data mainly include initial and surveillance ratings, in-
terest rate, credit support, and other tranche-specific information. Bloomberg
also has abundant coverage on loan-specific information. More than 200 fields
are available for loan level data and the variables used in this chapter include
LTV, DSCR, loan balance, amortization schedule, and other characteristics
related to the risk of the loan.
Table 12 shows the summary statistics for deal level and tranche level
information for CMBS in our sample. Several notable observations provide
some insights into the CMBS rating market. First, the average number of
ratings received by a tranche is 2.45. Most issuers obtained two to three
ratings from the five rating agencies. Second, Moody’s had the highest market
share. Third, the average numerical rating is between 19 and 20 and this
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suggests an average alphabetic rating of A+ and AA-. If I use tranche balance
to calculate weighted average rating, even higher average ratings appear since
AAA tranches are usually the biggest portion of a deal.
Table 13 presents the summary statistics for loan level data for CMBS
in my sample. For loan level analysis performed in this paper, I use loans
originated between 2005-2008 to calibrate delinquency predicting model, and
I then utilize the calibrated prediction model to forecast the probability of
delinquency for the loans originated between 2011-2014. Panel A shows the
statistics for the calibration period and Panel B shows the statistics for the
testing period. The statistics illustrate that the delinquency rate for loans
securitized in the calibration period are significantly higher than those in the
testing period. Moreover, loans in the testing period generally have a safer
risk profile.
3.4 Methodology and Results
3.4.1 Market Share Change after the Entry
After the financial crisis, the SEC was encouraged by the Dodd-Frank
Act to promote competition in the credit rating market and KBRA became
NRSRO on February 11, 2008 (?). KBRA rated its first CMBS deal on Jan-
uary 19, 2011 (?). KBRA claims that “KBRA was established in 2010 in an
effort to restore trust in credit ratings by creating new standards for assessing
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risk and by offering accurate and transparent ratings.”7 Prior to the recogni-
tion, KBRA acquired LACE Financial, which primarily focused on ratings of
financial institutions.
Figure 20 shows the change in CMBS rating market share by these five
credit rating agencies. According to data collected from Bloomberg, KRBA
only rated four CMBS deals in 2011 but its market share quickly rose to 20%
and surpassed all other rating agencies except Moody’s. Since then, it has
maintained its market share in CMBS. Interestingly, despite the large volume
in CMBS rated by KBRA, KBRA only had 13 credit analysts and supervisors
in 2011 compared to 1,345 at S&P’s and 1,204 at Moody’s (?).
3.4.2 Rating Comparison between the Entrant and the Incumbents
Each tranche of a CMBS deal is commonly granted more than one
rating so rating disagreements are sometimes observed.8 A new entrant to the
credit rating market may give more generous ratings as a potential way to
quickly gain market share. Table 14 shows the comparison between ratings
issued by KBRA and the incumbents. In Panel A, I document the percentage
of “over-rate” which describes the rating agency giving the tranche a higher
rating than any of other rating agencies. In 2011, 21.5% ratings issued by
KBRA were higher than at least one of the other rating agencies while this
rate was only 5% for other agencies. This pattern consistently repeated itself
7https://www.krollbondratings.com/overview.
8Rating disagreements are more prevalent after the crisis.
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in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The “over-rate” percentages were economically and
statistically different between KBRA and the rest of the rating agencies.
It appears that KBRA gave more generous ratings than other rating
agencies since the inception of its CMBS business. Moreover, this leniency
in rating coincides with the surge in its market share against the established
incumbents. However, the evidence from rating disagreement alone is not
sufficient to make a decisive conclusion for mainly two reasons. First, the
deals and tranches rated by KBRA may just be intrinsically less risky. Thus,
in this case, KBRA may just issue accurate ratings rather than being generous.
Second, the rating disagreement approach ignores the information for these
deals that is not rated by KBRA and the approach also does not incorporate
the CMBS risk-related information of the CMBS. In the following two sections,
I provide further evidence that KBRA gives more lenient ratings than the
incumbents after controlling for the risk of CMBS.
3.4.3 AAA Subordination Level Comparison between the Entrant
and the Incumbents
In this section, I use a measure of average rating received by a CMBS
deal and I show that CMBS rated by KBRA are granted with higher ratings,
even after controlling for deal level risk characteristics and time fixed effects.
AAA subordination level—the fraction of a CMBS that does not receive AAA
ratings—is a common measure for a deal’s average rating. AAA subordination
level equals the maximum amount of losses a deal may sustain before the loss is
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allocated to AAA tranches. Thus, a higher level corresponds to a lower rating.
Following Equation (3.1), I run a regression with the AAA subordination level
as the dependent variable on an indicator variable that equals one if the deal
is rated by KBRA. I also control for various risk characteristics and time fixed
effects.
AAASubordinationLeveli = α0+β1RatedbyKBRAi+γControlsi+Y earFEs+i
(3.1)
Table 15 presents the regression results. Model (1) is the baseline re-
gression that does not include the indicator variable for rating agency. Model
(2) shows that being rated by KBRA reduces the AAA subordination level
(i.e. higher average deal rating) by 2.25% and the impact is significant at a
95% level.
3.4.4 Predicted Probability of Delinquency Comparison between
the Entrant and the Incumbents
In the previous section, I used the AAA subordination level and risk
characteristics to show that CMBS rated by KBRA are granted with higher
ratings compared to those rated by other agencies. In this section, I further
strengthen my analysis by demonstrating that the loans included in the deals
rated by KBRA are inherently more risky than other loans.
I follow a three-step procedure for this analysis. In the first step, I
use historical performance data for seasoned commercial mortgage to develop
prediction models based on the delinquency status, risk characteristics, and
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location of the property. In the second step, the calibrated prediction models
are applied to the newly-issued loans since 2011 to get the predicted probability
of delinquency. Finally, I use a regression analysis to study whether those
loans included in the CMBS rated by KBRA are more risky than the rest of
the loans.
Table 16 shows the regression used to calibrate two types of prediction
models. Model (1) uses an OLS regression with delinquency status of the loan
as the dependent variable and risk characteristics as explanatory variables.
Model (2) adopts a logistic regression instead of an OLS regression. For Models
(3) and (4), I use 2000-2008 data instead 2005-2008 data used in Models (1)
and (2). Models (1) and (3) follow an OLS regression and Models (2) and (4)
follow logistic regression. Nevertheless, these models produce similar results
in terms of predicted probability of delinquency. It is worthwhile to note
that the directions of the coefficients presented in the models align with my
expectation.
After calibrating the model and producing predicted delinquency prob-
ability for loans securitized between 2011-2014, following Equation (3.2), I run
a regression with the predicted delinquent probability as a dependent variable
and the indicator variable, which equals one when the loan is included into a
CMBS deal rated by KBRA. Table 17 shows that those loans securitized into
KBRA CMBS are on average more likely to be delinquent for 0.5% - 1.6%.
The magnitudes are significant at a 99% level. This relative difference from
the average predicted probability (ranging from 6.9%-13.3%) of delinquency is
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very substantial (about 10% more likelihood).
PredProbofDelqi = α0 + β1RatedbyKBRAi +QuarterFEs+ i (3.2)
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined the entry of KBRA into the CMBS
market. The entrant gives more generous ratings on the same securities, which
also received ratings from the incumbents. From 2011-2014, 13.8% of the
CMBS tranches rated by KBRA were granted higher ratings compared to the
7.3% for other rating agencies. The leniency in ratings coincides with the
quick market share surge by KBRA. In the second year after KBRA entered
the CMBS market, its market share had already risen up to 20%, and it has
maintained and grown its share ever since. I further performed two additional
analyses to test whether KBRA gave more generous ratings after controlling
risk characteristics of CMBS. A deal level analysis shows that deals rated by
KBRA have a 2.25% less AAA subordination level than other deals. This dif-
ference translates to a substantial benefit to the bond issuer since the increase
in the AAA-rated portion of CMBS leads to less interest payment to bond
investors due to its AAA rating. In a loan level analysis, I used historical real-
ized delinquency to predict the delinquent probability of newly issued CMBS
loans. The evidence shows that loans securitized into deals rated by KBRA,
on average, have about a 10% higher likelihood of becoming delinquent. All
of this evidence confirms that KBRA was more lenient on CMBS ratings and
its deal was more risky than the incumbents’.
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The policy implication of this chapter is straightforward: regulators
should rethink their strategy of promoting more competition to improve rating
quality. Since CMBS rated after entry have a limited life and business cycle
exposure, it is still too early to judge the accuracy of the ratings based on
realized performance. The nature of the real estate market suggests that a
multi-decade time horizon is needed to judge the performance of the rating
models and criteria. As time goes by, it will interesting to study how the
incumbent rating agencies react to the rating leniency by the entrant.
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Figures
Figure 1: Histogram of Over-estimation.
This figure presents the histogram of over-estimation of NOI for years between
1995 and 2006. Over-estimation of NOI is calculated by comparing UW NOI
and Realized NOI of origination year following Equation 1.3. The dotted line
is drawn by symmetrically mirroring the kernel density estimation for negative
values at zero.
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Figure 2: Average Over-estimation by Year of Origination.
This figure presents the average over-estimation of NOI by loan origination
year. The data range from 1997 to 2013. The 1995 and 1996 over-estimation
are not plotted due to limited sample size. Annual issuance for U.S. non-agency
CMBS is presented on the right y axis.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Over-estimation in Different Periods.
This figure compares the histogram of over-estimation of NOI in different time
periods. Over-estimation of NOI is calculated by comparing UW NOI and
Realized NOI of origination year following Equation 1.3. The dotted line is
drawn by symmetrically mirroring the kernel density estimation for negative
values at zero.
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Figure 4: Over-estimation and Originator Fixed Effect.
The figure presents the scatter plot between average over-estimation aggre-
gated by originator and originator fixed effect on over-estimation. Originators
with at least 500 available samples from 1995 to 2006 are included. The orig-
inator fixed effects are from an OLS regression of over-estimation of NOI on
loan characteristics with state fixed effects and quarter of origination fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are sandwich estimators. The triangle markers indicate
that the fixed effects are significant at a 5% level. Bank of America is the
reference originator.
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Figure 5: Kernel Regression of Over-estimation and LTV Ratio.
This figure shows the kernel regression of over-estimation on LTV ratio. The
kernel regression uses second order Gaussian kernel with fixed bandwidths.
The red lines are at a 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 6: Kernel Regression of Over-estimation and DSCR.
This figure presents the kernel regression of over-estimation on DSCR. The
kernel regression uses second order Gaussian kernel with fixed bandwidths.
The red lines are at a 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 7: The Relationship between Over-estimation of NOI and LTV.
This figure presents the relationship between Over-estimation of NOI and LTV.
Over-estimation of NOI is calculated by comparing UW NOI and Realized NOI
of origination year following Equation 1.3. This histogram of initial LTV ratio
is plotted.
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Figure 8: Histogram of Over-estimation for LTV on and off 5-unit Thresholds.
This figure presents the histogram for loans with LTV at 5-unit thresholds
(e.g. 75% and 80%) and the other loans. Over-estimation of NOI is calcu-
lated by comparing UW NOI and Realized NOI of origination year following
Equation 1.3. Loans with over-estimation between -100% and 100% are in-
cluded. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to the test the equality of the
distributions.
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Figure 9: Histogram of Over-estimation for DSCR on and off 5-unit Thresh-
olds.
This figure presents the histogram for loans with DSCR at 5-unit thresholds
(e.g., 1.20 and 1.25) and the other loans. Over-estimation of NOI is calcu-
lated by comparing UW NOI and Realized NOI of origination year following
Equation 1.3. Loans with over-estimation between -100% and 100% are in-
cluded. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to the test the equality of the
distributions.
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Figure 10: Probability of Delinquency and Originator Fixed Effect.
The figure presents the scatter plot between average delinquency aggregated
by originator and originator fixed effect on delinquency. Originators with at
least 500 available samples from 1995 to 2006 are included. The originator
fixed effects are the results from OLS regression of delinquency status dummy
on loan characteristics with state fixed effects and a quarter of origination
fixed effects. Standard errors are sandwich estimators. The triangle markers
indicate the fixed effects are significant at a 5% level. Bank of America is the
reference originator.
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Figure 11: Over-estimation and Probability of Delinquency by originators.
The figure presents the scatter plot between average over-estimation and av-
erage delinquency aggregated by originator. Originators with at least 500
available samples from 1995 to 2006 are included.
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Figure 12: Originator Fixed Effects for Over-estimation and Delinquency.
The figure presents the scatter plot between originator fixed effects on over-
estimation and delinquency. Originators with at least 500 available samples
from 1995 to 2006 are included. The originator fixed effects are the results from
OLS regression of over-estimation and delinquency status dummy, respectively,
on loan characteristics with state fixed effects and quarter of origination fixed
effects. Standard errors are sandwich estimators. The triangle markers in-
dicate that the over-estimation fixed effects are significant at 5% level. The
black markers indicate that the delinquency fixed effects are significant at 5%
level. Bank of America is the reference originator in both regressions.
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Figure 13: Percentage of Rating Disagreements by Vintage.
This figure presents percentage of CMBS tranches with rating disagreement
by vintage. We define initial rating as the credit rating received within 90
days after the settlement date. We restrict the sample to ratings provided by
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations.
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Figure 14: Comparison of AAA Subordination Level and Delinquency.
This figure presents the average AAA subordination level and Severe Delin-
quency of CMBS in the sample by the year of issuance. The subordination
level is the sum of the balance of non-AAA tranche divided by the total balance
of the deal. The Severe Delinquency is the proportion of the underlying loans
which are delinquent for 90 days or longer. The severe delinquency values are
captured at the third year origination date of CMBS deals. Both values are
presented in percentages.
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Figure 15: Annual CMBS Issuance by Year.
This figure presents the number of CMBS issued by vintage. Our statistics
only contain non-agency CMBS. The data are collected from Bloomberg.
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Figure 16: AAA Subordination Level and LTV.
This figure presents the scatter plot of AAA subordination levels and loan-to-
value ratios. The subordination level is the sum of the balance of non-AAA
tranche divided by the total balance of the deal. Samples outside the range
of the figure are ignored. AAA subordination level and LTV are presented in
percentages.
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Figure 17: AAA Subordination Level and DSCR.
This figure presents the scatter plot of AAA subordination level and debt-
service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). The subordination level is the sum of the
balance of non-AAA tranche divided by the total balance of the deal. Samples
outside the range of the figure are ignored. AAA subordination level are
presented in percentages.
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Figure 18: AAA Subordination Level and Delinquency at Third Year.
This figure presents the scatter plot of AAA subordination level and Severe
Delinquency at the end of the third year after origination. The subordination
level is the sum of the balance of non-AAA tranche divided by the total balance
of the deal. The Severe Delinquency is the proportion of the underlying loans
which are delinquent for 90 days or longer. The severe delinquency values
are captured at the third year after origination date of CMBS deals. Two
dashed lines mark the average AAA subordination level before and after the
crisis, respectively. 96.6% of pre-crisis CMBS have lower AAA subordination
levels than the average level of post-crisis CMBS. Both values are presented
in percentages.
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Figure 19: Non-parametric Estimation on Proportion of AAA Rated Tranche.
This figure presents the scatter plot of the proportion of AAA rated tranche
(p) and its predicted value (pˆet ). The proportion of AAA rated tranche is the
sum of the balance of all AAA rated tranche divided by the total balance
of the deal. The size of the marker shows the standard error for the kernel
estimation. Round markers correspond to deals before financial crisis (≤ 2008)
while triangle makers refer to post financial crisis (≥2009). The red line is the
45◦ line.
93
Figure 20: Change in Rating Agencies’ Market Share.
This figure presents the change in market share over time. Market shares are
calculated at a deal level. Total market share is normalized to 1.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Delinquency and Loan Characteristics.
Variable N Mean SD
Delinquency 96816 0.07 0.25
LTV 92906 0.67 0.13
DSCR 91121 1.61 1.55
Original Balance (Million) 96816 10.5 58.0
Coupon 96815 7.09 1.51
Term 96816 152.05 79.77
Fixed 96816 0.93 0.26
Multiple Property 96184 0.03 0.18
Partial Amortization 96816 0.42 0.49
Full Amortization 96816 0.50 0.50
Retail 96184 0.32 0.47
Lodging 96184 0.08 0.27
Industrial 96184 0.19 0.39
Multifamily 96184 0.27 0.44
This table presents summary statistics for delinquency status and loan characteristics for
CMBS with available loan level data from 1995 to 2013.
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Table 4: Over-estimation of NOI and Loan Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Over-estimation Model Model Model
LTV 0.12*** 0.30***
(6.21) (11.28)
DSCR 0.03*** 0.09***
(4.64) (10.59)
Log Loan Balance 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(7.80) (9.77) (8.22)
Coupon 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(3.79) (5.48) (6.25)
Term 0.00* 0.00 0.00**
(1.81) (1.52) (1.96)
Fixed -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(-4.50) (-4.31) (-4.03)
Multiple Property 0.02 0.02 0.02
(1.08) (1.15) (1.24)
Partial Amortization -0.04*** -0.02** -0.00
(-4.04) (-2.41) (-0.38)
Full Amortization -0.01* 0.01 0.01
(-1.71) (0.60) (1.32)
Retail 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01**
(2.43) (2.58) (2.15)
Lodging -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(-5.01) (-5.73) (-6.71)
Industrial 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.99) (0.74) (0.33)
Multifamily 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(5.55) (6.43) (5.61)
Constant -0.57*** -0.65*** -0.95***
(-10.08) (-10.40) (-14.15)
Observations 28,867 28,867 28,867
State FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.0495 0.0488 0.0543
This table presents the regression of over-estimation of NOI on loan characteristics. Over-
estimation of NOI is calculated by comparing UW NOI and Realized NOI of origination
year following Equation 1.3. Model (1) excludes DSCR, Model (2) excludes the LTV ratio,
and Model (3) includes all variables. All regressions include state fixed effects and quarter of
origination fixed effects. Standard errors are sandwich estimators. T -statistics are presented
in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 5: Interest Rate and Over-estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Coupon/Spread Model Model Model
Over-estimation 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.03
(6.57) (5.01) (1.55)
LTV 0.40*** -0.00 -0.08
(10.97) (-0.00) (-0.68)
DSCR -0.02*** -0.28*** -0.22***
(-4.05) (-3.65) (-4.86)
Log Loan Balance -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.11***
(-27.83) (-17.99) (-17.42)
Term 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(16.54) (8.96) (7.37)
Fixed -0.28*** -0.34*** 0.80***
(-8.23) (-5.87) (2.77)
Multiple Property 0.09*** 0.06 0.09***
(4.54) (1.59) (2.99)
Partial Amortization 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.12***
(21.03) (6.37) (4.77)
Full Amortization 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.04*
(15.66) (5.59) (1.81)
Retail -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.03***
(-7.96) (-5.97) (-2.85)
Lodging 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.06***
(6.28) (5.64) (3.43)
Industrial -0.04*** -0.02 -0.06***
(-4.80) (-1.33) (-4.67)
Multifamily -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.17***
(-19.80) (-10.13) (-14.03)
Constant 10.20*** 11.92*** 9.59***
(137.30) (42.13) (25.00)
Observations 26,908 9,260 8,989
State FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.858 0.842 0.878
This table presents the result of an OLS regression of loan interest rate on the over-estimation
of NOI and loan characteristics. Loan interest rate is the annualize coupon charged to the
borrower. In the case of floating rate loans, the dependent variable is the spread between
interest rate and the benchmark interest rate (e.g., Libor). Over-estimation of NOI is calcu-
lated by comparing UW NOI and Realized NOI of origination year following Equation 1.3.
All regressions include state fixed effects and quarter of origination fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are sandwich estimators. T -statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 6: Effect of Over-estimation by Originator on Delinquency
(1) (2) (3)
Delinquency Model Model Model
Average Over-estimation by Originator 20.03***
(5.87)
LTV 46.26*** 32.32*** 29.66***
(15.36) (9.23) (9.12)
DSCR 0.97 0.64*** 0.63***
(-0.54) (-3.13) (-3.18)
Log Loan Balance 1.10*** 1.11*** 1.13***
(4.56) (4.12) (4.59)
Coupon 1.53*** 1.34*** 1.34***
(13.01) (9.65) (9.66)
Term 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.00***
(15.12) (9.74) (9.65)
Fixed 2.19*** 1.46*** 1.91***
(5.93) (2.69) (4.40)
Multiple Property 1.50*** 1.67*** 1.63***
(3.97) (4.02) (3.78)
Partial Amortization 1.49*** 1.51*** 1.43***
(4.42) (3.37) (2.89)
Full Amortization 1.60*** 1.64*** 1.58***
(5.70) (4.65) (4.29)
Retail 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.66***
(-7.32) (-6.89) (-6.64)
Lodging 0.62*** 0.60*** 0.60***
(-6.48) (-5.54) (-5.47)
Industrial 0.59*** 0.51*** 0.52***
(-8.67) (-8.24) (-7.93)
Multifamily 0.50*** 0.56*** 0.55***
(-9.82) (-6.76) (-6.83)
Observations 59,013 28,541 28,541
State FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.0662 0.0607 0.0634
This table presents the odds ratios of a logistic regression where delinquency status is the
dependent variable. Delinquency is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is delin-
quent for ninety days or more, in foreclosure, REO, default. Average Over-estimation by
Originator is average Over-estimation of NOI aggregated by originators. Over-estimation
of NOI is calculated by comparing UW NOI and Realized NOI of origination year following
Equation 1.3. Regression in Models (1) and (2) presents the result for base line regression
without Average Over-estimation by Originator. Model (1) includes all samples from 1995
to 2006, Model (2) includes a sample where over-estimation data is available, and Model
(3) presents the result of regression with Average Over-estimation by Originator. All re-
gressions include state fixed effects and quarter of origination fixed effects. Standard errors
are sandwich estimators. T -statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
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Table 7: Whether Over-estimation is Priced Sufficiently
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Coupon Delinquency Delinquency
Over-estimation 0.06*** 4.05***
(6.06) (6.42)
Coupon 2.68***
(15.21)
LTV 0.36*** 20.76*** 15.39***
(13.08) (18.59) (21.65)
DSCR -0.01*** 0.44*** 0.41***
(-4.26) (7.90) (7.88)
Log Loan Balance -0.12*** 0.23 0.56***
(-29.62) (1.43) (5.74)
Term 0.00*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(16.73) (9.77) (16.55)
Fixed -0.29*** 1.38 0.82*
(-9.27) (1.14) (1.70)
Multiple Property 0.07*** 2.54** 2.44***
(3.29) (2.12) (3.64)
Partial Amortization 0.32*** 3.97*** 2.04***
(21.99) (5.62) (4.52)
Full Amortization 0.21*** 4.03*** 2.64***
(16.23) (6.10) (6.23)
Retail -0.06*** -3.16*** -2.84***
(-8.53) (-6.06) (-8.79)
Lodging 0.07*** -3.44*** -3.74***
(6.55) (-4.96) (-8.64)
Industrial -0.04*** -3.50*** -3.58***
(-4.67) (-6.33) (-10.59)
Multifamily -0.15*** -4.14*** -4.08***
(-17.84) (-7.99) (-12.78)
Constant 7.97*** -17.13*** -34.76***
(141.78) (-5.99) (-15.35)
Observations 29,785 29,785 75,906
State FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.857 0.0782 0.0992
This table presents three regression results related to the question of whether over-estimation
is priced insufficiently. U.S. non-agency CMBS deals issued between 1995 and 2006 are in-
cluded. Model (1) has the coupon/spread at origination as dependent variable and it shows
the relationship between coupon and over-estimation. Model (2) has delinquency as the
dependent variable and shows the relationship between delinquency and over-estimation.
Model (3) has delinquency as the dependent variable and shows the relationship between
delinquency and the coupon/spread at origination. All dependent variables are in percent-
ages. All regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors are sandwich estimators.
T -statistics are presented in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 8: Regression of AAA Subordination Level on Average Over-estimation
by Deal
(1) (2) (3)
AAA Subordination Level Model Model Model
Average Over-estimation by Deal 0.91
(0.43)
Average Over-estimation by Deal (2nd) 0.32
(1.35)
Deal WAC Spread 0.78** 0.26 1.32***
(2.02) (0.58) (3.73)
LTV 0.16** 0.33*** 0.13*
(2.04) (4.81) (1.74)
DSCR -0.49 -0.06 -1.81
(-0.28) (-0.05) (-1.29)
Zero or Negative Amortization 0.10*** 0.04 0.05
(3.10) (1.13) (1.55)
Partial Amortization 0.07* 0.06 0.05
(1.81) (1.35) (1.41)
Num of Loans -0.01* -0.00 -0.00
(-1.77) (-0.30) (-0.39)
Log Deal Balance -4.20*** -2.65 -3.07**
(-3.70) (-1.63) (-2.22)
Office -0.05 -0.01 -0.04
(-1.51) (-0.18) (-1.03)
Retail -0.09*** -0.04 -0.04
(-3.48) (-1.25) (-1.32)
Hotel 0.07 -0.00 0.05
(1.43) (-0.03) (1.03)
Industrial -0.09*** 0.00 -0.04
(-2.75) (0.05) (-1.34)
Constant 96.20*** 48.00* 73.55***
(4.34) (1.71) (2.93)
Observations 349 215 296
Year FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.634 0.665 0.675
This table presents the regression result of AAA subordination level on average over-
estimation by deal and other deal characteristics. The dependent variable of this regression
is AAA subordination level, which is the percentage of the tranche of a deal below a AAA
rating. The AAA subordination level measures the safety cushion for the deal against losses.
I require at least 40% of the loans to have over-estimation available to be included in the
regression. U.S. non-agency CMBS deals issued between 2000 and 2006 are included. All
regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors are sandwich estimators. T -statistics
are presented in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 10: Main Estimation Results
Normal Transformation: Φ−1(p)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Logit Transformation: log( p
1−p)
Model (1’) Model (2’) Model (3’)
pet
Delinquency
LTV
DSCR
Zero/Neg. Amt.
Partial Amt.
# of Loans (1000)
Log Deal balance
Deal Spread
Office
Retail
Industrial
Multifamily
(Intercept)
3.371∗∗∗ 3.646∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.051)
0.000
(0.001)
−0.598∗∗∗ −0.049 0.030
(0.148) (0.064) (0.051)
−0.076∗∗∗ 0.010 0.034∗∗
(0.020) (0.008) (0.011)
−0.214∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.027
(0.037) (0.015) (0.015)
0.134∗∗ 0.026 0.073∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.020) (0.015)
0.882∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.081∗
(0.131) (0.063) (0.039)
0.209∗∗∗ −0.020∗ −0.016∗
(0.017) (0.008) (0.007)
−2.637∗ −0.482 0.107
(1.028) (0.421) (0.364)
0.299∗∗∗ 0.006 0.066∗∗
(0.061) (0.024) (0.025)
0.335∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗ 0.009
(0.058) (0.022) (0.026)
0.175∗∗ 0.015 0.068∗∗
(0.065) (0.025) (0.025)
0.187∗ −0.048 0.017
(0.092) (0.038) (0.032)
−3.227∗∗∗ −1.400∗∗∗ −1.849∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.154) (0.141)
5.785∗∗∗ 6.407∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.109)
0.000
(0.001)
−1.028∗∗∗ −0.085 0.054
(0.259) (0.116) (0.109)
−0.126∗∗∗ 0.018 0.078∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.014) (0.024)
−0.343∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.064) (0.027) (0.032)
0.249∗∗ 0.060 0.159∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.035) (0.032)
1.593∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗ 0.182∗
(0.230) (0.113) (0.083)
0.352∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.034∗
(0.030) (0.015) (0.014)
−5.004∗∗ −1.340 0.148
(1.798) (0.763) (0.776)
0.517∗∗∗ 0.005 0.148∗∗
(0.106) (0.044) (0.053)
0.559∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.101) (0.039) (0.055)
0.298∗∗ 0.010 0.147∗∗
(0.114) (0.046) (0.053)
0.313 −0.102 0.046
(0.160) (0.069) (0.068)
−5.442∗∗∗ −2.287∗∗∗ −3.277∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.279) (0.301)
Adj. R2 0.608 0.939 0.960 0.599 0.932 0.942
Num. obs. 632 632 453 632 632 453
The table presents the estimation results. The dependent variable is Φ−1(p). Model
(1) does not include peer effects. In Model (2), we include peer effects as a regressor;
see (2.7). In Model (3), we include the delinquency at third year as one of the
explanatory variables. Note that Model (1) is nested in our specification. Models
(1’), (2’) and (3’) are similar to Models (1), (2) and (3), respectively, except that
our dependent variable uses the logit transformation, that is, logit(p) = log( p1−p ).
Moreover, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 11: Numerical Rating Value Assignment
Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch DBRS KBRA Numerical Rating Value
AAA Aaa AAA AAA AAA 23
AA+ Aa1 AA+ AAH AA+ 22
AA Aa2 AA AA AA 21
AA- Aa3 AA- AAL AA- 20
A+ A1 A+ AH A+ 19
A A2 A A A 18
A- A3 A- AL A- 17
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ BBBH BBB+ 16
BBB Baa2 BBB BBB BBB 15
BBB- Baa3 BBB- BBBL BBB- 14
BB+ Ba1 BB+ BBH BB+ 13
BB Ba2 BB BB BB 12
BB- Ba3 BB- BBL BB- 11
B+ B1 B+ BH B+ 10
B B2 B B B 9
B- B3 B- BL B- 8
CCC+ Caa1 CCC CCCH CCC+ 7
CCC Caa2 CCC CCC CCC 6
CCC- Caa3 CCC CCCL CCC- 5
CC Ca CCC CCH CC 4
C Ca CCC CH C 3
D C DDD D D 2
NR WR WD NR NR 1
This table presents the mapping between alphabetical ratings to assigned numerical
rating values for S&P’s, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS, and KBRA, respectively. The
alphabetical rating scales are directly comparable among the five rating agencies.
Value 2 corresponds to “default” and value 1 corresponds to “not rated.”
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Table 12: Summary Statistics: Deal and Tranche Level Information
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A. Deal Level Information
AAA Subordination Level 177 29.61 12.13 15.75 63.57
LTV 177 58.93 8.37 36.90 81.22
DSCR 177 2.28 1.01 1.37 7.40
Zero/Negative Amortization 177 38.38 41.02 0.00 100.00
Partial Amortization 177 19.49 21.57 0.00 100.00
Num of Loans 177 41.08 35.54 1.00 208.00
Deal Balance (Millions) 177 142.00 171.00 22.50 1180.00
Deal Spread 177 2.22 0.96 -0.64 6.83
Office 177 21.20 25.20 0.00 100.00
Retail 177 35.37 31.06 0.00 100.00
Hotel 177 22.30 30.51 0.00 100.00
Industrial 177 13.28 17.32 0.00 100.00
Multifamily 177 7.86 13.38 0.00 100.00
Panel B. Tranche Level Information
Number of Ratings 5092 2.45 0.64 1 4
Rated by SAP 5092 0.30 0.46 0 1
Rated by MDY 5092 0.78 0.42 0 1
Rated by Fitch 5092 0.64 0.48 0 1
Rated by DBRS 5092 0.31 0.46 0 1
Rated by KBRA 5092 0.54 0.50 0 1
Numeric Rating SAP 1495 19.09 4.29 8 23
Numeric Rating MDY 3649 19.80 4.33 8 23
Numeric Rating Fitch 3121 19.44 4.53 8 23
Numeric Rating DBRA 1554 19.86 4.45 8 23
Numeric Rating KBRA 2647 19.87 4.32 8 23
This table presents the summary statistics for deal level and tranche level data.
CMBS issued between January 2011 and May 2014 with available information are
covered.
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Table 13: Summary Statistics: Loan Level Information
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A. Calibration Period (2005-2008)
Delinquency 35753 0.14 0.35 0 1
LTV 35540 0.68 0.13 0.01 1.21
DSCR 35616 1.50 1.19 -0.13 79.41
Log Loan Balance 35747 15.57 1.30 -4.61 22.29
Term 35753 144.07 81.21 9 480
Fixed 35753 0.89 0.31 0 1
Multiple Property 35753 0.05 0.22 0 1
Zero/Negative Amortization 35753 0.18 0.38 0 1
Partial Amortization 35753 0.13 0.33 0 1
Full Amortization 35753 0.69 0.46 0 1
Office 35753 0.17 0.37 0 1
Retail 35753 0.31 0.46 0 1
Hotel 35753 0.10 0.30 0 1
Industrial 35753 0.16 0.37 0 1
Multifamily 35753 0.26 0.44 0 1
Panel B. Testing Period (2011-2014)
Delinquency 4518 0.00 0.05 0 1
LTV 4514 0.65 0.10 0.01 0.87
DSCR 4047 1.84 1.57 0.66 88.02
Log Loan Balance 4518 16.42 1.14 13.26 21.65
Term 4518 110.48 39.93 14 360
Fixed 4518 0.97 0.17 0 1
Multiple Property 4518 0.11 0.31 0 1
Zero/Negative Amortization 4518 0.11 0.31 0 1
Partial Amortization 4518 0.20 0.40 0 1
Full Amortization 4518 0.70 0.46 0 1
Office 4518 0.13 0.34 0 1
Retail 4518 0.26 0.44 0 1
Hotel 4518 0.18 0.38 0 1
Industrial 4518 0.15 0.36 0 1
Multifamily 4518 0.28 0.45 0 1
This table presents the summary statistics for loan level data. I break down the
sample by calibration period (2005-2008) and testing period (2011-2014). Partial
data is available for 2014 vintage.
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Table 14: Rating Comparison between the Entrant and the Incumbents
Panel A. Comparison between KBRA and Other Rating Agencies
KBRA All except KBRA
Vintage N Mean 95% CI N Mean 95% CI
2011 93 21.5% 13.2% 29.9% 1309 5.0% 3.8% 6.1%
2012 663 12.2% 9.7% 14.7% 2619 5.3% 4.4% 6.2%
2013 1397 13.9% 12.1% 15.7% 4407 8.9% 8.1% 9.7%
2014 494 14.0% 10.9% 17.0% 1484 8.2% 6.8% 9.6%
Total 2647 13.8% 12.4% 15.1% 9819 7.3% 6.8% 7.8%
Panel B. Example
Deal Ticker Class KBRA SAP MDY FITCH DBRS
GSMS 2012-TMSQ A 23 23
GSMS 2012-TMSQ B 22 20
GSMS 2012-TMSQ C 18 17
GSMS 2012-TMSQ D 16 15
GSMS 2012-TMSQ XA 23 23
GSMS 2012-TMSQ XB 23 20
This table presents the percentage of “over-rate” (i.e. the situation where the rating
agency issues a higher rating than the one issued by any of the other agencies).
Panel A shows the results by comparing KBRA with the remaining rating agencies
over years 2011-2014. Panel B presents an example in which KBRA “over-rate” the
CMBS deal where Class B, C, D, and XB obtained higher ratings from KBRA than
SAP. Partial data is available for 2014 vintage.
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Table 15: Relationship between the CMBS rated by KBRA and AAA Subor-
dination Level
(1) (2)
AAA Subordination Level Model Model
Rated by KBRA -2.25**
(-2.21)
LTV 0.18 0.18
(1.31) (1.35)
DSCR -0.13 -0.15
(-0.10) (-0.12)
Zero/Negative Amortization 0.08*** 0.08***
(3.47) (3.64)
Partial Amortization -0.04 -0.04
(-1.31) (-1.24)
Num of Loans -0.13*** -0.13***
(-3.42) (-3.50)
Log Deal Balance -5.04*** -5.04***
(-3.26) (-3.32)
Deal Spread 0.24 0.15
(0.30) (0.19)
Office -0.02 -0.01
(-0.28) (-0.23)
Retail -0.07 -0.06
(-1.37) (-1.19)
Hotel 0.07 0.07
(1.16) (1.20)
Multifamily 0.07 0.07
(1.18) (1.16)
Constant 122.79*** 122.34***
(3.94) (4.04)
Observations 177 177
Year FE YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.749 0.756
This table presents the regression results, which show how the average rating for
CMBS deals rated by KBRA compares to deals rated by other agencies. The depen-
dent variable of this regression is AAA subordination level, which is the proportion
of the deal below a AAA rating. The RatedbyKBRA is an indicator variable that
equals one if the deal is rated by KBRA. Model (1) shows the benchmark regression
with the indicator variable and Model (2) shows the full regression. U.S. non-agency
CMBS deals issued between 2011-2014 are included. Partial data is available for
2014 vintage.
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Table 16: Relationship between Delinquency and Loan Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delinquency Model Model Model Model
LTV 0.39*** 84.17*** 0.22*** 15.93***
(29.85) (19.37) (28.07) (13.09)
DSCR 0.01*** 0.50*** 0.00*** 0.27***
(7.30) (-7.53) (6.57) (-15.64)
Log Loan Balance -0.00** 0.97** -0.00*** 1.00
(-2.07) (-2.11) (-2.88) (-0.20)
Term 0.00*** 1.00*** 0.00*** 1.00***
(3.53) (4.85) (13.03) (12.90)
Fixed 0.01 1.17** 0.01* 0.99
(1.28) (2.56) (1.79) (-0.26)
Multiple Property 0.04*** 1.42*** 0.04*** 1.55***
(4.43) (4.44) (7.02) (6.49)
Partial Amortization 0.03*** 1.33*** -0.02*** 0.64***
(4.98) (3.93) (-5.40) (-7.15)
Full Amortization 0.06*** 1.64*** 0.02*** 1.12**
(12.61) (9.24) (6.62) (2.25)
Retail -0.05*** 0.71*** -0.04*** 0.70***
(-7.82) (-7.60) (-9.66) (-9.26)
Hotel -0.04*** 0.87** -0.01*** 1.01
(-5.47) (-2.11) (-2.91) (0.18)
Industrial -0.06*** 0.62*** -0.04*** 0.65***
(-9.44) (-8.52) (-9.82) (-8.78)
Multifamily -0.06*** 0.58*** -0.06*** 0.49***
(-10.26) (-10.70) (-14.77) (-16.39)
Constant -0.15*** 0.01*** 0.85*** 0.06***
(-3.67) (-5.58) (44.23) (-3.45)
Observations 37,028 37,023 66,511 66,504
State FE YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.0633 0.0449
Pseudo R-squared 0.0918 0.0911
This table presents the regression results for calibration of prediction model on
CMBS loan level delinquency prediction. Delinquency is an indicator variable that
equals one if the loan is delinquent for ninety days or more, is in foreclosure, REO,
default. Models (1) and (3) follow an OLS regression and Models (2) and (4) follow
logistic regression. Models (1) and (2) include samples from 2005-2008 and Models
(3) and (4) include samples from 2000-2008. All regressions include state fixed
effects. Partial data is available for 2014 vintage.
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Table 17: Relationship between Predicted Delinquency Probability and Being
Rated by KBRA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted Probability of Delinquency Model Model Model Model
Rated by KBRA 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.005***
(5.661) (3.342) (6.164) (3.710)
Constant 0.123*** 0.102*** 0.091*** 0.069***
(19.411) (19.168) (12.863) (19.156)
Observations 5,735 5,733 5,735 5,733
R-squared 0.048 0.055 0.159 0.071
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-squared 0.0452 0.0529 0.157 0.0685
This table presents the regression results with predicted probability of delinquency
as the dependent variable. The explanatory RatedbyKBRA is an indicator variable
that equals one if the deal is rated by KBRA. The Models in this regression cor-
respond to the four predictions Models presented in the last table. All regressions
includes quarter fixed effects. Partial data is available for 2014 vintage.
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Appendix 1
Proofs in Chapter 2
1.1 Proofs of Lemma 1
Proof. The non–identification result under a single equilibrium is straightfor-
ward given the discussions in this subsection. It suffices to show identification
under multiple equilibria. By (2.6), we have
E[Φ−1(p)|x, t] = β(x) + αE(p|x, t) + E(|x, t), t = 0, 1.
Note that t = 0, 1 represent the selection of different equilibria before and after
crisis. Therefore, the distribution of  given x is invariant for t = 0, 1. Hence,
E(|x, t) = E(|x) = 0. Hence,
E[Φ−1(p)|x, t] = β(x) + αE(p|x, t), t = 0, 1.
It follows that
E[Φ−1(p)|x, t = 1]− E[Φ−1(p)|x, t = 0] = α
[
E(p|x, t = 1)− E(p|x, t = 0)
]
from which we can identify α as
α =
E[Φ−1(p)|x, t = 1]− E[Φ−1(p)|x, t = 0]
E(p|x, t = 1)− E(p|x, t = 0) .
Moreover,
β(x) = E[Φ−1(p)|x, t = 1]− αE(p|x, t = 1).
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Hence, (α, β(·)) can be uniquely derived from the joint distribution of Fp|x,t.
1.2 Proofs of Theorem 1
Proof. We first show consistency, that is, θˆ
p→ θ0. Note that
θˆ−θ0 = Aˆ−1× 1
n
n∑
i=1
σˆ2i wˆi(w
′
i−wˆ′i)θ0+Aˆ−1×
1
n
n∑
i=1
σˆ2i wˆii = α0×Aˆ−1Bˆ+Aˆ−1Cˆ,
where Bˆ ≡ 1
n
∑n
i=1(ψˆi, σˆix
′
i)
′(ψˆi−ψi), Cˆ ≡ 1n
∑n
i=1 σˆ
2
i wˆii =
1
n
∑n
i=1(σˆiψˆii, σˆ
2
i ix
′
i)
′
and
Aˆ ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σˆ2i wˆiwˆ
′
i =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
ψˆ2i ψˆiσˆix
′
i
σˆixiψˆi σˆ
2
i xix
′
i
)
.
By definition, Aˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ are V-statistics. By the law of large number of
V-statistics,
Aˆ
p→ A ≡
 E{[pe(x, t)fx|t(x|t)]2} E{pe(x, t)f 2x|t(x|t)x′}
E
{
pe(x, t)f 2x|t(x|t)x
}
E
{[
fx|t(x|t)
]2
xx′
}  .
and Bˆ
p→ 0 and Cˆ p→ 0. Therefore, θˆ p→ θ0.
Next, we derive the asymtotic distribution of θˆ. Let B˜ ≡ 1
n
∑n
i=1(ψi, σix
′
i)
′(ψˆi−
ψi), C˜ ≡ 1n
∑n
i=1(σiψii, σ
2
i ix
′
i)
′. Following ?, given nh2d →∞, we have
√
n(Bˆ − B˜) = op(1),
√
n(Cˆ − C˜) = op(1).
Moreover, let δ0 = E[(pe(x, t), x′)′pe(x, t)f 2x|t(x|t)]. Following ?, there is
√
n
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
(ψi, σix
′
i)
′ψˆi − δ0
)
=
2√
n
n∑
i=1
(
(ψi, σix
′
i)
′ψi − δ0
)
+ op(1).
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It follows that
√
n(B˜ − δ0) = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(
(ψi, σix
′
i)
′ψi − δ0
)
+ op(1).
Therefore, applying the central limit theorem, we have
√
n
(
B˜ − δ0
C˜ − 0
)
d→ N
(
0,
(
ΣB ΣBC
Σ′CB ΣC
))
where
ΣB =
(
Var(ψ2) Cov(ψ2, fx|t(x|t)ψx′)
Cov(ψ2, fx|t(x|t)ψx) Var(fx|t(x|t)ψx)
)
,
ΣC = σ
2

(
E(f 2x|t(x|t)ψ2) E(f 3x|t(x|t)ψx′)
E(f 3x|t(x|t)ψx) E(f 4x|t(x|t)xx′)
)
,
and ΣBC = Σ
′
CB = 0. Therefore,
√
n(θˆ − θ0) d→ N(0, A−1(α20ΣB + ΣC)A−1).
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